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ACT OF INFIDELITY: WHY THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE
ACT IS UNFAITHFUL TO THE CONSTITUTION
Monolithic control of the value transmission system is
"a hallmark of totalitarianism 
.... ",1
INTRODUCTION
In Romer v. Evans,2 the Supreme Court held invalid a Colorado
state constitutional amendment which prohibited government action or
policies designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination. This deci-
sion struck such a powerful blow for the cause of gay and lesbian3 rights
that the opinion was hailed by some as "without doubt the most impor-
tant and symbolically momentous decision of the 1995-96 term." 4 In
truth, however, Romer did not even prove to be the year's "most impor-
tant and symbolically momentous" judicial ruling from the perspective of
gay and lesbian advocacy, much less from a more general perspective.
That honor was reserved for the ruling of Baehr v. Miike.5
In Miike, a Hawaii circuit court declared that the state of Hawaii had
failed in its attempt to demonstrate a compelling state interest in with-
holding the right to legal marriage from same-sex couples. Miike took a
major step toward legalizing same-sex marriages in Hawaii. 6 The pros-
pect of legal same-sex marriage seizes the imagination of the homosex-
ual community precisely because marriage represents the full integration
of gay and lesbian citizens into the American polity. As one gay and
lesbian publication noted, "Even the first win for lesbian/gay rights in the
1 Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy:
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 463, 480 (1983) (paraphrasing
P. BERGER & R. NEuHAus, To EMPOwER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN
PUBLIC POLICY 44 (1977)).
2 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
3 "Gay men and lesbians" has become the current term of choice but this paper will
occasionally use the politically incorrect term "homosexuals" to refer to gay men and lesbians.
Although some commentators find the word problematic, a (relatively innocuous) single-unit
appellation vastly improves the fluidity of prose and the clarity of thought. See, e.g., David
Link, Comment, The Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments of
Same-Sex Couples, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1055, 1059 n.25 (1990) (asserting that "homosex-
ual," used as a noun, implies a being "whose sole dimension is an erotic one"). But see
ANDREw SuurvAN, VmITuALLY NoRmAL at ix (1995) (concluding that, although somewhat
clinical, "homosexual" is the "most neutral term available").
4 David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. Tnums, Oct. 6, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at
82.
5 Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
6 See id. at *21. Only the state's immediate appeal prevented the trial court's ruling
from being final.
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Supreme Court in a generation could not really eclipse same-sex mar-
riage as the top lesbian/gay legal story for 1996." 7 Romer signified pro-
gress in the extension of constitutional protections to homosexuals, but
Miike, on a much more visceral level, generated hope that homosexuals
would soon be able to circumvent their greatest obstacle to full equality.8
In anticipation of what would be a watershed event in civil rights
reform, the U.S. Congress undertook to prevent this dream of equality
from coming to pass. Taking the "unprecedented step of defining mar-
riage, rather than deferring to state's [sic] definitions as had been the
practice," 9 Congress enacted the euphemistically titled Defense of Mar-
riage Act ("DOMA")-which President Clinton signed into law on Sep-
tember 21, 1996.10 DOMA proclaims:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, ter-
ritory, possession or tribe respecting a relationship be-
tween persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship. 11
Furthermore, DOMA limits the federal definition of marriage by
specifying:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between
7 Same-Sex Marriage Tops 1996 Lesbian/Gay Legal News as Hawaii Judge Orders
State to Issue Licenses, Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, at 1 (Dec. 1996) <http://qrd.rdrop.conqrd/
usa/legal/lgln/1996/12.96>.
8 See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 185 ("[Same-sex marriage] is the first step in any resolu-
tion of the homosexual question-more important than any other institution, since it is the
most central institution to the nature of the problem, which is to say, the emotional and sexual
bond between one human being and another. If nothing else were done at all, and gay mar-
riage were legalized, ninety percent of the political work necessary to achieve gay and lesbian
equality would have been achieved."); Link, supra note 3, at 1140 ("Same-sex marriage is
without question the most comprehensive and satisfactory answer to the problems facing gay
and lesbian couples."); David L. Chambers, What If?: The Legal Consequences of Marriage
and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447, 450
(1996)("[P]ermission for same-sex couples to marry under the law would signify the accept-
ance of lesbians and gay men as equal citizens more profoundly than any other nondiscrimina-
tion laws that might be adopted.").
9 Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recogni-
tion, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 108 n.2 (1996).
10 See id.
II Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as
28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
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one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or wife.' 2
At first glance, several questions come to mind about DOMA. First,
"Exactly which families are being defended by this law?" Presumably,
Congress would answer that DOMA protects the traditional nuclear fam-
ily (i.e., mother married to father with each child biologically related to
both parents). That answer would be much more compelling if more
Americans lived in traditional families. As of 1989, only 27% of Ameri-
can households consisted of two parents with children, down from 40%
in 1970.13 As of 1982, 25% of American children under the age of 18
did not live with both biological parents.' 4 By contrast, nontraditional
families based on homosexual unions are on the rise. While scholars
contest the exact figures (regarding the number of children raised by gay
parents), 15 many gay men and lesbians have made abundantly clear the
fact that they wish to participate in the institution of marriage 16 and that
12 Id. § 3 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7).
13 See Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26
GoNz. L. REV. 91, 91 n.L (1990/91) (citing Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage
Rights?, Tnvm, Nov. 20, 1989, at 101).
14 See Alissa Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134,
135 n.4 (1987-88) (citing BUREAU OF Tm CENSus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURmENr POPU-
LATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-20 No. 380, MAImAL STATUS AND LIVING AR-
RANGEMENTS: MARCH 1982, 5, Table F (1983)); see also Robert L. Elbin, Note, Domestic
Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and
Others), 51 Omo ST. L.J. 1067, 1086 (1990) ("[Olnly twenty-seven percent of American
households consist of two parents living with children.").
15 In 1989, the editors of the HARVARD LAW REvmw claimed, "Approximately three
million gay men and lesbians in the United States are parents, and between eight and ten
million children are raised in gay and lesbian households." WILIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 110 (1996) (quoting THE EDrrORs OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND Tm LAW 119 (1989)). William Eskridge notes that the Harvard
editors based their figure on "a secondhand report of a panel of family law experts at an ABA
meeting .... [N]ot a very good cite." Id. at 245 n.61. He considers both figures too high.
See id. at 110; see also Carrie G. Costello, Esq., Legitimate Bonds and Unnatural Unions:
Race, Sexual Orientation, and Control of the American Family, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 79,
140 (1992) (estimating one-quarter of gay men and one-third of lesbian women in America are
parents and that six to fourteen million children are being raised in lesbian and gay
households).
16 A 1994 poll conducted by THE ADVOCATE found that two-thirds of the gay men polled
wanted to get married, 85% were "open to the idea" and only 15% were uninterested. See
EsKRroGE, supra note 15, at 79 (citing Janet Lever, Sexual Revelations, ADvoc., Aug. 1994, at
17, 24). In a 1995 survey conducted by the same magazine, 70% of 2,600 lesbians indicated
they would marry if legally possible. See Chambers, supra note 8, at 449-50 (citing Janet
Lever, Lesbian Sex Survey, ADvoC., Aug. 22, 1995, at 27). The same survey also revealed that
46% of lesbians and 30% of gay men polled said that they "had exchanged rings or had [held]
a commitment ceremony." Id. at 449 n.5. This yearning for matrimonial legitimacy mani-
fested itself on the national stage when, as part of an April 1993 march for gay and lesbian
rights in Washington, D.C., "[h]undreds of couples joined together and exchanged vows in the
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they "want to have children, do have children, and rear them in fami-
lies."1 7 No causal link has been identified between the decline of the
traditional nuclear family and the rise of nontraditional homosexual fam-
ilies. Homosexuals compose such a small portion of the general popu-
lace that the notion that one has anything to do with the other is
laughable. If one is looking for the root cause of the decline of the tradi-
tional family, one would have better luck examining the ascension of no-
fault divorce laws in most states, the epidemic of unwed teenage preg-
nancy and the changing status of women who no longer have to remain
in bad marriages out of economic dependency. In short, DOMA de-
prives already burdened (nontraditional) families while doing nothing to
address the problems of those (traditional) families it is purportedly
"defending."
Second, "If the states cannot even agree on the fundamental defini-
tions of 'male' and 'female,' how can they all subscribe to a unitary
definition of 'marriage?"' Modem technology has blurred gender defini-
tions by permitting persons born male to become female, and vice versa.
Can a postoperative male-to-female transsexual marry a man? Looking
to "gender identification and sexual equipment,"18 New Jersey's interme-
diate appellate court has held that "she" can. 19 Other states, looking to
chromosomes (male-to-female transsexuals still retain a male XY pat-
tern; they do not develop a female XX pattern), have determined "she"
cannot.20 Whether one defines gender according to genitalia or chromo-
somes, "[a]t least one of these states has legally recognized21 a form of
same-sex union. Which one?"22 This impact of DOMA on transsexual
marriages may look like a marginal issue, but the definitional conflict
among the states speaks to the more general, underlying concern of inter-
state recognition. The plight of transsexuals, whose marriages lose and
regain their validity as they travel from state to state, illustrates the dan-
ger inherent in any attempt by a state to define whom a person may
presence of assembled friends and families." Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-
of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L.
REv. 1033, 1034 (1994) (citing Bettina Boxall & James Gerstenzang, Gays, Lesbians Cele-
brate on Eve of Rights March, L.A. TimEs, Apr. 26, 1993, at Al).
17 ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 110.
18 Id. at 93.
19 See id. (citing M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1976)).
20 See id. (citing Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) and Fran-
ces B. v. Mark B., 78 Misc. 2d 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)).
21 Technically, beyond the transsexual context, some states have indirectly recognized
same-sex marriages-although they may not realize it. Native American cultures have long
recognized same-sex marriages (called "berdache" marriages) which are valid under tribal law.
See id. at 92. "Some states have explicitly recognized tribal marriages as valid under their
state law, and such recognition implicitly validated some same-sex marriages under state law."
Id. (citing, as an example, 1957 Cal. Stat., ch. 2121, § 1).
22 Id. at 93.
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marry. That is, DOMA sacrifices uniformity and predictability as
America takes on the appearance of a mere confederacy, rather than a
union.23
Third, "Before enacting this law, did Congress give any weight to
the writings and arguments of the nation's legal scholars, the people who
have devoted their lives to studying the logic and evolution of our laws?"
This question is the easiest to answer: no, Congress did not. Between
1990 and June 1995, "only one of seventy-two articles, notes, comments,
or essays focusing primarily on same-sex marriage (only 1.4%) fully de-
fended the heterosexuality requirement for marriage."'24 Even that lone
maverick of the sampling failed to make an argument against same-sex
marriage on legal grounds (he based his position on religious grounds). 5
So, if Congress did not base its legislation on scholarly analysis, 26 where
did it turn for inspiration? As one of the two branches of government
directly controlled by majoritarian politics (the executive being the
other), Congress turned to the most volatile arbiter of social policy there
is: popular sentiment. A 1989 survey indicated that 69% of Americans
disapprove of the legalization of homosexual marriage. 27 More recent
23 Some proponents of DOMA have extolled it as a bulwark protecting "states' rights."
See, e.g., Letter from Harvard Law Professor Laurence H. Tribe to U.S. Senator Edward Ken-
nedy (May 24, 1996), in 142 CONG. REc. S5931-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (criticizing
"states' rights" argument as well as, more generally, DOMA's dubious constitutionality) [here-
inafter "Tribe Letter"]. Such rhetoric echoes the battle cry of the Confederacy during the U.S.
Civil War. Thus, an analogy between the Confederacy and DOMA supporters seems more
than appropriate. After all, advocates for the former sought to deny the full indicia of citizen-
ship to a certain group-just as advocates for the latter are trying to do today-in the name of
states' rights.
24 Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1996). Professor Wardle partly attributes this overwhelming
disparity to "an intellectual taboo against expressions unsympathetic to gay and lesbian prerog-
atives." Id. at 20. Oddly, she does not even acknowledge the possibility that most academics
(according to her sampling) favor same-sex marriage because the arguments against it lack
moral and intellectual merit.
25 See id. at 19 n.70 (citing Herbert W. Titus, Defining Marriage and the Family, 3 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 327 (1994)). Titus' piece repudiates secular legal analysis of the best
interests of society and espouses "theological and natural law arguments opposing same-sex
marriage and other family-redefining proposals." Id. at 19 n.70. Professor Wardle does note
that several recent law review articles have criticized "particular doctrinal arguments for same-
sex marriage" without rejecting the concept of same-sex marriage altogether. Id. at 19 n.71.
For example, she observes that, in one article, Cass Sunstein criticizes a range of constitutional
arguments in favor of same-sex marriage but makes clear that he "does not defend the hetero-
sexuality requirement or oppose same-sex marriage." Id. (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexu-
ality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994)).
26 Laurence Tribe's letter to Congress (written at the behest of Senator Edward Kennedy,
Democrat of Massachusetts) detailing DOMA's constitutional deficiencies apparently fell on
deaf ears. See generally Tribe Letter, supra note 23.
27 See Lisa M. Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federal-
ism: A View From the States, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 237, 244 (1996) (citing Michael L.
Closen & Carol R. Heise, H1V-AIDS and the Non-Traditional Family: The Argument for State
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surveys have yielded similar results.2 8 "[P]oliticians (including the presi-
dent) know that at the moment there is little public support for [same-sex
marriage] and little likelihood of serious political damage in opposing
it."29 Although there are some desultory indications that religious and
moral mores may be growing more tolerant towards same-sex mar-
riage,30 such attitudinal shifts seem to be moving at a glacial pace. Sim-
ply put, DOMA owes its birth to the union of Capitol Hill realpolitik
with the straight majority's unbridled fear.
The aforementioned issues-Congress's inattention to the real
problems afflicting American families, the potential nightmare of multi-
farious, state-created definitions of marriage and politicians' disdain for
scholarly opinion-take secondary status to the critical question: "Is
DOMA constitutional?" 31 Based on the constitutional doctrine articu-
lated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the answer is no. Several different
modes of analysis substantiate this conclusion. Part I of this paper dem-
and Federal Judicial Recognition of Danish Same-Sex Marriages, 16 NOVA L. REv. 809, 809
(1992)).
28 Professor Wardle reports that polls show Americans opposing same-sex marriage by a
margin of about two to one. See Wardle, supra note 24, at 57 (citing, among others, ROPER
CENTER AT UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, PUBLIC OPINION ONLINE (reporting on Tuvm/CNN/
Yankelovich Partners Inc. poll, taken June 15-16, 1994, released June 17, 1994: "Do you think
marriages between homosexual men or between homosexual women should be recognized as
legal by the law? Yes - 31%, No - 64[%], Not Sure - 5[%].")). One may wonder at the fact
that Professor Wardle does not try to diminish public opinion against same-sex marriages (by
attributing it, say, to homophobic taboos) in the same manner she does scholarly opinion (by
attributing it to an "intellectual taboo" favoring homosexuals). Such preconceived bias leaves
her article's stance against same-sex marriage looking more outcome determinative than ob-
jectively reasoned.
29 Paul Reidinger, Politically Expedient: What are Legislators Really Up to When They
Pass Laws of Dubious Constitutionality?, 82 A.B.A. J. 79, 80 (Oct. 1996). The political power
of mass homophobic bias should not be underestimated. An argument can be made that such
bias ultimately led to the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment. One commentator quotes an
anti-ERA organizer as saying, "For one thing, [the ERA] would allow gays to marry and adopt
children. If anything ever happened to me, I don't want to think that gays could adopt my
children." Costello, supra note 15, at 130 (quoting JOHN D'EMIlio & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN,
INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 353 (1988) (citation omitted)).
30 "While the major sects and denominations of the Jewish and Christian faiths continue
to disapprove of homosexual conduct and same-sex marriage, some are moving toward greater
acceptance." Julienne C. Scocca, Society's Ban on Same-Sex Marriages: A Reevaluation of
the So-Called "Fundamental Right" of Marriage, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 719, 761-62
(1992) (footnote omitted). The appendix to Professor Eskridge's book excerpts letters from
twelve clergy members of various denominations (including the Jewish faith) voicing their
support of same-sex marriages. ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 193-217. Several universities,
such as Harvard, are currently considering allowing same-sex couples to perform commitment
ceremonies within their chapels. See Janie Kim, Task Force Appointed to Investigate Same-
Sex Unions at Memorial Church, HARv. L. REc., Feb. 28, 1997, at 1, 4.
31 One should keep in mind the question is not, "Would the U.S. Supreme Court, as
currently constituted, find the Defense of Marriage Act constitutional?" That question falls
beyond the scope of this paper.
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onstrates why DOMA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 32 Part II
examines DOMA's violation of substantive due process rights. Part III
explores how DOMA results in a blatant abridgment of equal protection
of the law. Part IV questions whether DOMA could even withstand the
Court's least exacting level of scrutiny: rational basis review. Finally,
Part V compares the state's interest in enjoining same-sex marriage with
the state's interest in permitting same-sex marriage. These different lines
of reasoning all lead to the same conclusion: DOMA does not pass con-
stitutional muster.
I. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ANALYSIS
Of the many ironies surrounding DOMA (e.g., it defends marriage
by preventing it), the most prominent is that Congress claims its author-
ity to write the law derives from the Full Faith and Credit Clause,33 the
constitutional clause to which DOMA does the most violence. Article
IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution states: "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judi-
cial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Although the clause clearly em-
powers Congress to enact general laws prescribing the "effect" of official
state acts in other states,34 reading that power to completely nullify inter-
state recognition of state acts into the single term "effect," amounts to "a
play on words, not a legal argument."35 The lesser power of prescribing
the effect of full faith and credit simply cannot contain the greater power
of negating full faith and credit altogether.36 Nonetheless, debating se-
mantics alone ignores the constitutional history of the clause. A proper
analysis entails reviewing how the Constitution's Framers, the U.S.
32 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
33 Senator Don Nickles, Republican of Oklahoma and the Act's Senate sponsor, pro-
claimed that the Act demonstrates Congress's Article IV power to "prescribe the manner in
which [the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state] shall be proved,
and the effect thereof." Reidinger, supra note 29, at 79.
34 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
35 Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Less Perfect Union, N.Y. TrAEs, May 25, 1996, at All.
36 Laurence Tribe elaborated on this point in his letter to Congress:
[C]ongressional power to "prescribe... the effect" of sister-state acts, records, and
proceedings, within the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, includes no
congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records and proceedings that would
otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as
judicially interpreted shall instead [be] entitled to no faith or credit at all!
The reason is straightforward: Power to specify how a sister-state's official acts
are to be "proved" and to prescribe "the effect thereof' includes no power to decree
that, if those official acts offend a congressional majority, [they] need to be given no
effect whatsoever by any State that happens to share Congress's substantive views.
Tribe Letter, supra note 23, at S5932.
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Supreme Court and the states themselves have interpreted the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Upon reviewing the clause from these three perspec-
tives, one can conclude not only that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
bestows no power on Congress to enact such a law, but also that DOMA
stands as a complete affront to the clause.37
A. THE FRAMERS' UNDERSTANDING
Any analysis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause must overcome one
initial hurdle: that its scope and logic have remained relatively unex-
plored-especially as it pertains to marriage. When the Framers added
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the Constitution, "there was little
debate over it."38 Historian Jack Rakove says, "There wasn't much dis-
course on the clause at the Constitutional Convention .... Mainly it was
considered a step toward creating an integrated union, a way of saying
that the states are less than fully sovereign and owe a good-faith obliga-
tion to the other states." 39 One revision, however, suggests that the
Framers believed the Full Faith and Credit Clause should be much more
peremptory than discretionary. The Framers approved James Madison's
proposal to change "ought to be given" to "shall be given."'40 Although
public policy exceptions have been read into the clause by succeeding
generations, 41 such exceptions can hardly be imputed to the "original
intent" of the Framers.
37 Indeed, Professor Tribe expressed such a strong conviction regarding the "anterior
question" of DOMA's noncompliance with the Full Faith and Credit Clause that he felt there
was no need to attack DOMA on due process or equal protection grounds. See id. He feared
the latter approaches would prove less successful in defeating DOMA since same-sex relation-
ships garner "unfavorable legal treatment for no [discernible) reason beyond public animosity
to homosexuals." Id. (citation omitted); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995
Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HAv. L. REv. 4, 97 n.492 (opining that
the Supreme Court could strike down DOMA without concluding that same-sex marriages are
protected by the Equal Protection Clause).
38 Habib A. Balian, Note, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith and Credit to
Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. Rv. 397, 407 (1995) (citing 2 MAX FAAD, THE REcORDs OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 445-50, 488-89 (rev. ed. 1911)). Aside from a brief
proposal (which was never discussed again) by Charles Pinckney to include a provision for
bankruptcy debts and some textual revisions by James Madison, not much was said about the
clause. See id. at 407. In fact, there is some speculation that the Framers' reticence can be
attributed to a nefarious intent behind the clause's insertion into the Constitution. To be blunt,
it is possible that the motivation behind the Full Faith and Credit Clause "was to allow slave
masters to move freely between states without fear of losing their slave property." Id. (citing
PAUL FiNKELmAN, AN IMPERFacr UNION 21-22 (1981)).
39 Reidinger, supra note 29, at 80.
40 Balian, supra note 38, at 407 n.48 (citing 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 489 (rev. ed. 1911)). "This change was extremely important
because it mandates that states must give full faith and credit to sister state judgments. Before
the change this was optional by the states ...." Id. at 407 n.48.
41 See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
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B. Tim SUPREME COURT'S UNDERSTANDING
Few of the Supreme Court's past opinions shed much light on
DOMA's compliance (or lack thereof) with the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. If one seeks judicial precedent, "it must be sought in analogous
areas rather than in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself,
for Congress has never attempted to exercise its Full Faith and Credit
enforcement power to nullify rather than to enforce the mandate of that
clause." 42 Fortunately, insight can be found in a Supreme Court opinion
on a closely analogous issue: the application of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to divorces. In Williams v. North Carolina,43 the Court stated:
[W]hen a court of one state.., alters the marital status
of one domiciled in that state by granting him a divorce
from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree should
be excepted from the [F]ull [F]aith and [C]redit [C]lause
merely because its enforcement or recognition in another
state would conflict with the policy of the latter.44
In Williams, the Court expressed two primary concerns in deciding that a
divorce granted in one state would be valid in every state. First, the
Court wanted to avoid "polygamous marriages." 45 Without interstate
recognition of divorces, divorced individuals who remarried could have
been subject to criminal prosecution for bigamy or polygamy upon re-
marriage. Second, the Court hoped to ensure "the protection of innocent
offspring of marriages deemed legitimate in other jurisdictions. '46 If a
state deemed an individual a bigamist or polygamist, then the state would
invalidate the individual's current marriage, rendering any children of
that marriage illegitimate.
If one substitutes marriage for divorce, the Supreme Court's con-
cerns expressed in Williams apply with equal force. Consider a same-sex
couple which lawfully marries in Hawaii and then separates without a
divorce.47 If other states were able to withhold recognition of the mar-
riage, one of those parties could legally remarry in a nonrecognizing state
but be subject to bigamy prosecution in Hawaii (or in any state that rec-
ognized the marriage). 48 The illegitimacy issue bears just as much rele-
vance. Children raised by same-sex couples legally married in Hawaii
would be considered illegitimate in every state that withholds recognition
42 Tribe Letter, supra note 23, at S5932-33.
43 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
44 Id. at 303.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Of course, this hypothetical assumes that the state's final appeal in Miike will be
unsuccessful.
48 See Balian, supra note 38, at 415.
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of the marriage.49 In short, "a rule would be fostered which
[would] . . . 'bastardize children [who are] supposed to be the offspring
of lawful marriage."' 50
Although marriage and divorce do not perfectly parallel each other
in terms of legal strictures and consequences, 51 the Court, in a subse-
quent related opinion, did not find the analogy too strained:
Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not merely to the
immediate parties. It affects personal rights of the deep-
est significance. It also touches basic interests of soci-
ety. Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new status,
every consideration of policy makes it desirable that the
effect should be the same wherever the question arises.5 2
This passage underscores the strength of the divorce analogy 53 when
considering the Supreme Court's potential review of DOMA. If the
Court finds the analogy54 so persuasive as to rule that the effect of all
legal marriages "should be the same wherever the question arises," then
DOMA must fall.
C. THE STATES' UNDERSTANDING
James Madison's revision of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
the reasoning behind Williams are both telling, but they are not directly
on point. Consequently, the Supreme Court would no doubt seek gui-
dance from the only resource that has developed a thoughtful discourse
on the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to marriage: the
states themselves. As a bit of background, one should "begin by recog-
nizing the general rule preferring validation of marriages, which exists
with an 'overwhelming tendency' in the United States." 55 According to
49 See id. at 416.
50 Williams, 317 U.S. at 301 (quoting Haddok v. Haddok, 201 U.S. 562, 628 (1906)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
51 For example, one generally has to be a domiciliary of a state to get a divorce there
while one generally does not have to be domiciled in a state to be married there.
52 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945) [hereinafter "Williams Ir'].
53 Advocates within the gay and lesbian tights movement find Williams and Williams II
highly dispositive. See Henry J. Reske, A Matter of Full Faith: Legislators Scramble to Bar
Recognition of Gay Marriages, 82 A.B.A. J. 32, 34 (Jul. 1996) (quoting Evan Wolfson, direc-
tor of the Marriage Project of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund Inc. as saying,
"How can it be that divorce is honored throughout the country and marriage is not?").
54 A less obvious, but equally compelling, analogy can be found in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), which states that Congress may not enact statutes that
"dilute" a constitutional mandate's "self-executing force as authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Court." Tribe Letter, supra note 23, at S5933 (referring to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment). By enacting DOMA, Congress has not simply tried to dilute the mandate of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, but to eviscerate it completely.
55 Cox, supra note 16, at 1064 (citing WLAM M. RicHMAN & WiLLiAM L. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 116, at 362 (2d ed. 1993)).
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this general rule, "marriages will be found valid if there is any reasonable
basis for doing so. ''56 Courts have traditionally found the laws of the
state in which the marriage was performed (or lex celebrationis) to be a
"reasonable basis" for recognition.57 That is, most courts subscribe to
the belief that "a marriage valid when entered into should be recognized
as valid everywhere. s58 This widespread observance of lex celebrationis
is attributable to pragmatic concerns:
Substantively, states have interests not only in designat-
ing the parties who may lawfully marry, but also in pro-
moting the stability of marriage as an institution. Thus,
a state might want to recognize a marriage validly en-
tered into in another jurisdiction to promote predictabil-
ity and stability for the couple involved. Recognition
may also further comity interests. Each state has an in-
terest in ensuring that marital relationships entered into
under its auspices are respected by other states.59
Of course, as is the case with any general rule, certain exceptions have
emerged over the course of time.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws gives courts a frame-
work within which to operate when determining whether to apply excep-
tions to the general rule of recognition. Section 283 states:
(1) The validity of marriage will be determined by the
local law of the state which, with respect to the particu-
lar issue, has the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in
[section] 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the
state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere
be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant
56 Id.
57 See Note, In Sickness and In Health, In Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws
and Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 H&Av. L. Rv. 2038, 2041 (1996) [hereinafter
In Sickness] (citing Wnu.iAm M. RicHMAN & WmLiAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CON-
FLICT OF LAws § 116, at 362-63 (2d ed. 1993)).
58 IL "The traditional state rule for determining the validity of a marriage performed
elsewhere is to rely upon the laws of the state in which it was performed." Farabee, supra note
27, at 277 (citing Joseph Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law
Implications of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MND. L. REv. 450, 454
(1994)).
59 In Sickness, supra note 57, at 2042 (footnotes omitted); see also Anthony Dominic
D'Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 911, 917 (1995) (articulating states' interests in "protecting the
justified expectation of the parties" and in "maximizing the values of certainty, predictability
and uniformity").
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relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time
of the marriage. 60
Section 6 complements section 283 by stating, "A court, subject to con-
stitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law."'61 This framework basically prescribes a three-step mode
of analysis for courts.
In step one, the court must ask, "Did the forum state have the 'most
significant relationship' to the spouses when they married?" 62 If the an-
swer is no, the court must recognize the marriage. 63 If the answer is yes,
in step two, the court must ask, "Has the forum state issued a 'statutory
directive' prohibiting the marriage in question?" If the answer is yes, the
marriage is invalid within the state. If the answer is no, in step three, the
court must ask, "Does the marriage violate a 'strong public policy' 6" of
the forum state?" If the answer is yes, the marriage is invalid within the
state; if no, the marriage retains validity within the state. 65
As yet, most states have not enacted statutes explicitly banning
same-sex marriages, 66 but a small number of states have passed so-called
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
61 Id. § 6(1).
62 A comment to § 283 indicates that the state with the most significant relationship
would be the "state where at least one of the spouses was domiciled at the time of the marriage
and where both made their home immediately thereafter." Id. § 283(2) cmt. j.
63 Under this interpretation of the Restatement, "adhering to lex celebrationis and refus-
ing to invalidate a marriage... would be appropriate even in the case of a couple who were
domiciled in a disapproving state, got married in Hawaii, and then moved to another disap-
proving state-the forum." In Sickness, supra note 57, at 2044 n.34.
64 "A state's public policy is expressed in its court decisions, constitution and legislation.
A state could not simply refuse to recognize [same-sex] marriages; the state's legal materials
would have to establish same-sex marriages explicitly violate its public policy." Farabee,
supra note 27, at 278. The existence of anti-sodomy laws within a state does not necessarily
constitute a "strong public policy" against same-sex marriages. Two factors support this asser-
tion. First, anti-sodomy laws have traditionally not been restricted to homosexuals. See Link,
supra note 3, at 1092 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 n.1 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)). Second, such laws are seldom enforced anymore. See D'Amato, supra note 59,
at 940 (citing Michael L. Closen & Carol R. Heise, HIV-AIDS and the Non-Traditional Fam-
ily: The Argument for State and Federal Judicial Recognition of Danish Same-Sex Marriages,
16 NOVA L. Rev. 809, 829 & n.85 (1992)). One should keep in mind that, even in the most
celebrated sodomy case of recent memory, Bowers v. Hardwick, the state prosecutor had de-
cided not to press charges against the gay man who challenged the anti-sodomy statute. See
Link, supra note 3, at 1065-66 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986)).
65 "If neither an evasion statute nor any clear public policy demonstrates that same-sex
marriages should not be approved, a state may be forced to recognize such unions under the
Full Faith and Credit [Clause] .... " Farabee, supra note 27, at 278 (footnote omitted).
66 Although, in anticipation of Hawaii's impending recognition of same-sex marriage,
there has been a wave of legislation to ban same-sex marriages (and the recognition thereof),
only four states were initially able to get their "anti-marriage" bills enacted: Georgia, Idaho,
South Dakota and Utah. See id. at 249 n.61 (citing Telephone Interview with Evan Wolfson,
Director of Lambda Delta (April 8, 1996)). Similar legislation failed in Colorado, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington,
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"Marriage Evasion Acts" that specify that "marriages performed in other
states that violate their laws will not be recognized." 67 The problem with
such statutes, even if they do not explicitly forbid same-sex marriages, is
that courts may feel free to "read" such a ban into the law.68 Perhaps
leery of the havoc that such judicial discretion could cause, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
withdrew the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act69 and replaced it with the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act7" ("UMDA"), which espouses a pol-
icy of recognizing a marriage if it is valid under the laws of the state
where it was contracted. 71 A comment following section 210 of the
UMDA suggests that any "state adopting this Act should repeal the ear-
lier one [i.e., the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act], if it exists therein. '72
Even if every evasion statute were repealed, however, the "public policy"
exception would still imperil the validity of every same-sex marriage.
Courts have demonstrated a propensity to use "the public policy ex-
ception expansively as an 'escape hatch' rather than narrowly as it was
originally conceived. ' 73 One can easily imagine that, in the minds of
some state legislators and state judges, DOMA trumps the Restate-
ment-and thereby vouchsafes even greater public policy discretion.
Some states may disregard the narrow scope outlined by the Restatement
and "employ the exception even when [the forum state] was not the state
with the most significant relationship at the time of the marriage." 74 The
irony of the matter becomes apparent when one discovers that the excep-
tion was falling into desuetude and disfavor until DOMA revived it. The
NCCUSL had taken a rather stem view of the exception to the point of
West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See id. However, many states may consider DOMA
some type of federal mandate encouraging them to "try again" to devise anti-marriage legisla-
tion. It is simply too early to tell how such bills will be received in state legislatures across the
country in light of DOMA.
67 Id. at 277 (citing Michael L. Closen & Carol R. Heise, HIV-AIDS and the Non-Tradi-
tional Family: The Argument for State and Federal Judicial Recognition of Danish Same-Sex
Marriages, 16 NovA L. REv. 809, 813-14 n.9 (1992)). These states are Arizona, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Dakota, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See id.
68 See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. REv.
1508, 1606 (1989) (noting that courts often "interpret" prohibitions on same-sex marriage into
general marriage statutes) [hereinafter "Developments"].
69 9 U.L.A. XXI (1957).
70 9A U.L.A. 147, 176-77 (1987).
71 See id. at § 210, 176-77; D'Amato, supra note 59, at 922 n.67; see also In Sickness,
supra note 57, at 2051 (asserting that the withdrawal of approval for the Uniform Marriage
Evasion Act indicates "further support for the unconditional interstate validity of legal
marriages").
72 9A U.L.A. at 177.
73 In Sickness, supra note 57, at 2044 n.32 (citing WiLAm M. RicHMAN & WmLiAm L.
REYNOLDS, UNDERsANDING CoNFicr OF LAWS § 59, at 159-61, § 70, at 198 (2d ed. 1993)).
74 Id. at 2045.
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eliminating it completely. The comment to section 210 of the UMDA
plainly states:
[Section 210] codifies the emerging conflicts principle
that marriages valid by the laws of the state where con-
tracted should be valid everywhere, even if the parties to
the marriage would not have been permitted to marry in
the state of their domicil .... [This] section expressly
fails to incorporate the "strong public policy" exception
of the Restatement and hence may change the law in
some jurisdictions. This section will preclude invalida-
tion of many marriages which would have been invali-
dated in the past.75
To date, eighteen states have adopted the UMDA validation section or
some other type of marriage validation statute.76 Clearly, DOMA halted
a general trend toward the unconditional recognition of marriages that
conformed to the laws of the states where they were performed. Does
this stunning reversal mean states will be able to withhold recognition of
legal same-sex marriages by invoking either statutory directives or public
policy? In a word, no.
Traditionally, a marriage has never been considered the type of
"legal judgment" entitled to full faith and credit because the state's only
role in the proceeding is to issue a marriage certificate. 77 Instead, full
75 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 210 cmt., 9A U.L.A. at 176 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added). The text of § 210 itself provides that:
All marriages contracted within this State prior to the effective date of this Act, or
outside this State, that were valid at the time of the contract or subsequently vali-
dated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the domicil of the
parties, are valid in this state.
Id. § 210, at 176. This section is a "paradigm validation statute." In Sickness, supra note 57,
at 2050. "[M]any states have used marriage validation statutes to adopt the basic conflict-of-
laws principle that a marriage that is valid where it is entered into should also be valid in the
'new' state. Such statutes are designed to promote stability, predictability, and uniformity, and
to protect the expectations of the parties to the marriage." Id.
76 Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana and Washington have
adopted the UMDA validation section while Arkansas, California, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming have enacted non-
UMDA validation statutes. See id. at 2051 n.71.
77 See Balian, supra note 38, at 403. The reason for the development of this "legal
judgment" requirement is unclear. After all, the plain language of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause accords recognition to public acts, records and judicial proceedings-not judicial pro-
ceedings alone. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. A strong argument can be made that a mar-
riage certificate alone, absent any further legal proceedings, should warrant full faith and
credit. See Balian, supra note 38, at 404 n.30. Courts have ruled that birth certificates are
"public records" within the meaning of the clause because they are published and certified by
the state. See id. (citing Bennett v. Schweiker, 532 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1982)). Marriage
certificates are "issued by the state and certified by the county clerk and therefore are arguably
just as much a public record as a birth certificate." Id. at 404.
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faith and credit has generally applied to judgments requiring some sort of
court enforcement, such as money judgments and judgments for specific
performance or injunctions. 78 A very simple proceeding is available to
married couples who wish to obtain judicial decrees declaring their mari-
tal status: the declaratory judgment.79 A same-sex couple married in Ha-
waii could simply proceed to the nearest courthouse and file for a
declaratory judgment asserting their status as a married couple. Such a
judgment is entitled, without exception, to full faith and credit because a
"valid judgment rendered in one State of the United States will be recog-
nized and enforced in a sister State even though the strong public policy
of the latter State would have precluded recovery in its courts on the
original claim." 80 Furthermore, when the Full Faith and Credit Clause
applies, it does so "even if its application will interfere with a significant
interest of another state."81
Two objections may be raised to such use of declaratory judgments.
First, one could note that, to obtain a declaratory judgment, there must be
78 Id. at 403 n.27. According to one commentator, the only reported case applying full
faith and credit to validate a marriage is Ram v. Ramharack, 571 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1991), a case involving a common-law marriage which, due to that very fact, had to be created
by a court judgment. See Balian, supra note 38, at 403.
79 Of course, other types of judicial decrees could serve the same purpose. For example,
a probate court may have to determine if a couple is legally married in order to fulfill a
condition in a will or contract. See Balian, supra note 38, at 404. Nonetheless, a declaratory
judgment may be most useful because it remains available even in the absence of some other
underlying controversy.
80 Id. at 419 (quoting RwSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNE'LIcr OF LAWS § 17 (1988)) (em-
phasis added).
81 Id. (citing Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), where Court held that when "a
decree is entitled to full faith and credit, it must be given credit notwithstanding the state of the
simms' public policy."). A proponent of DOMA could argue that the RESTATEmENT, quoted
supra note 80, and Fauntleroy only prohibit public policy exceptions, but are silent with regard
to statutorily created exceptions (i.e., evasion statutes). Therefore, the argument continues,
states could use statutory exceptions to deny full faith and credit. This argument, however,
fails. The RSTATEME and Fauntleroy do not mention statutory exceptions most likely be-
cause they clearly violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Would the clause mean anything at
all if states could create statutes in order to withhold recognition of the official acts of sister
states with which they disagree? No, it would not. Public policy exceptions to quasi-official
state acts (such as the issuance of marriage certificates) at least present a more difficult analyti-
cal question-because it is not clear whether the sister-state's act is "official." In the case of an
evasion statute denying full faith and credit to a clearly official state act (such as a legal
judgment), however, such a statute must be unconstitutional. An examination of this nation's
common law bolsters this assessment. There is not a single reported civil case in which full
faith and credit was not applied to a legal judgment because another state's interest, whether
expressed statutorily or as a vague public policy, was too strong. See Balian, supra note 38, at
419 (citing Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943)); see also Hampton v.
M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818) (stating the Full Faith and Credit Clause de-
mands that "the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in
every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced"); cf.
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 97 n.492 ("Congress has never enacted a statute allowing states not
to recognize any judgments of other states.").
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an "actual controversy" 82-and no such controversy exists in a proceed-
ing where both parties (i.e., the married couple) agree that a valid mar-
riage exists. This objection overlooks one critical point: thanks to
DOMA and the local evasion statutes it has inspired, marriage is per se
an "actual controversy" for same-sex couples the moment they say "I
do." The very purpose of a declaratory judgment is "to prevent an in-
fringement of rights before it occurs. ' 83 Through DOMA, Congress has
created the potential for the "infringement" of any legally married same-
sex couple's rights should they decide to travel to a nonrecognizing
state-as is their right under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause. 84 Without a declaratory judgment, a same-sex
couple's marriage is not truly settled in terms of legal consequences and
expectations. With a declaratory judgment, a homosexual couple can
rest assured that their marital status must be recognized in every state
and, therefore, that their Privileges and Immunities rights are
unfettered. 85
Second, potential objectors could argue that declaratory judgments,
which are technically equitable decrees, are not entitled to the same force
and effect accorded other legal judgments. The only response to this
objection is that there is no basis for making a distinction between de-
claratory judgments and other judgments when applying the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. The Framers, in clear and express language, indicated
that states must extend full faith and credit to all judicial proceedings. 86
Nothing in the language of either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or its
implementing statute87 suggests that declaratory judgments (or equitable
decrees generally) fall beyond their purview. Also, the vast majority of
states have adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act which states
in no uncertain terms: "Courts of record within their respective jurisdic-
tions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed .... [S]uch declara-
82 Balian, supra note 38, at 405 (footnote omitted); see also James A. Burnes, Civil
Procedure, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 425, 429-33 (1956) (arguing that declaratory judgments are only
applicable to justiciable controversies).
83 Balian, supra note 38, at 405 (citing Bell v. Associated Indep., Inc., 143 So. 2d 904,
907-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)).
84 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,- § 1.
85 Ironically, arguing that an "actual controversy" exists would be much more difficult in
the absence of DOMA. Without DOMA, one could only claim that the general prejudice
against homosexuals would generate the justiciable controversy-a much weaker argument.
See, e.g., Balian, supra note 38, at 405. The fact that there is a federal law directly undermin-
ing marital decrees legally issued in a given state brings the controversy into greater relief.
86 See id. at 408.
87 Congress has effectuated the Full Faith and Credit Clause by providing that "[s]uch
Acts, records, and judicial proceedings or copies thereof... shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States [that they have in the state] from which they are
taken." Id. at 400 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988)).
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tions shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree."88
Thus, this second objection lacks force because there is no historical,
textual or practical basis for any distinction to be made between declara-
tory judgments and other legal judgments.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has one central purpose: to act as
"a nationally unifying force.., by making each [state] an integral part of
a single nation, in which rights . . . established in any [state] are given
nation-wide application." 89 Practically speaking, the clause achieves this
objective by avoiding "relitigation of adjudicated issues." 90 So, as much
as DOMA threatens to unravel the integrated fabric of the nation by de-
nying full faith and credit to marriages, this law cannot do the same to
marriages validated by legal judgments-that is, "adjudicated" mar-
riages. Based on the understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
manifested by the Framers, the Supreme Court and the states, the clause
did not imbue Congress with the power to enact DOMA-and it should
be ruled unconstitutional. Should the Supreme Court fail to strike down
DOMA, however, same-sex couples will de facto be able to repeal the
law by seeking declaratory judgments.91 Thus, the fate of DOMA hinges
not just on the constitutional interpretation of the highest Court, but also
on the equitable power of every court.
II. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
DOMA impinges a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment:92 the right to marriage. -Before con-
ducting any type of due process analysis, the right in question must be
defined at "a high enough level of generality to permit unconventional
variants to claim protection along with mainstream versions of protected
conduct." 93 DOMA advocates may argue that-homosexuals are attempt-
ing to read a "special right" into the Due Process Clause which simply is
88 UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS Acr § 1, 12 U.L.A. 313 (1996) (emphasis added).
To date, forty-three states have adopted this legislation. See 12 U.L.A. at 309-10.
89 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); see also Williams, 317
U.S. at 303 (stating that the "Constitution... in no small measure brings separate sovereign
states into an integrated whole through the medium of the [F]ull [Flaith and [C]redit
[C]lause").
90 Balian, supra note 38, at 413 (citing Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 407 (1952)).
91 See Cox, supra note 16, at 1092 (suggesting that declaratory judgments can be used by
same-sex couples to clarify their marital status) (footnote omitted).
92 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Since DOMA is a piece of federal legislation, the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which only applies to the states, has no bearing on
this analysis. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
93 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AaMRicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-21, at 1428 (2d ed.
1988); see also Cox, supra note 16, at 1057 (chastising courts that focus "on the existence of a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage, instead of applying the already recognized fundamen-
tal right to marry to same-sex couples").
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not there. Even a cursory review of Supreme Court opinions, however,
reveals a fundamental right to marry.94 Hence, if properly framed, the
issue is not, "Is there a right to same-sex marriage in addition to the right
to marry?" Rather, the issue is, "Does the fundamental right to marry
include the right to marry a same-sex partner?" 95 Upon assessing the
internal logic of the Supreme Court's due process doctrine, one must
conclude that the fundamental right to marry includes the right to marry
intrasexually.
A. THE TRADITION-CENTERED FOCUS OF DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE
Due process analysis is often characterized as "backward-looking"
because it requires a great deal of emphasis on tradition and past prac-
tices.96 Unfortunately, with regard to same-sex marriage, a "traditional"
view can impede the process of determining protected rights. First, the
United States boasts a number of distinct and conflicting traditions. An
appeal to a single, unitary tradition "incorrectly presuppose[s] that our
moral traditions as a community are homogeneous. '97 Since most cul-
tures in the world currently have representatives in the United States, one
must take a more worldly perspective in examining how same-sex mar-
riages have been viewed "traditionally." This more worldly approach
demonstrates that several ancient cultures (e.g., Egypt, classical Greece,
imperial China, republican Rome and imperial Rome), as well as several
modern cultures (e.g., certain societies in Africa, Asia and Australia),
have accepted same-sex marriage. 98 Nevertheless, even if one uses
Judeo-Christian traditions to examine the validity of same-sex marriages,
inconsistencies still abound. There is evidence that homosexuals were
married in early Christian marriage ceremonies until more than four cen-
turies into the Christian Era.99 Moreover, during the Middle Ages, the
94 See infra part 1I.B.
95 See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumbering
Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64 FoRD-
HAM L. REv. 921, 952 (1995) (asking if fundamental right to marry applies to homosexuals).
96 Cass Sunstein has characterized due process analysis as backward-looking and rever-
ential of tradition in order to contrast it with equal protection analysis, which he considers
forward-looking and critical of discriminatory traditions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orien-
tation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1988).
97 Scocca, supra note 30, at 741 (citing David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Privacy and
Homosexual Love, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 895, 902 (1986)).
98 See ESKRMDGE, supra note 15, at 6; see generally William N. Eskridge, A History of
Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419 (1993); D'Amato, supra note 59, at 930 (noting
traditions of same-sex marriage found throughout history). One should not attribute the em-
brace of same-sex marriage to "foreign" cultures alone. Native Americans have also been
open to same-sex marriages. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 6.
99 See Link, supra note 3, at 1085-86 (citing JorN BoswELL, CmRsTIANrrv, SocIAL ToL-
ERANCE AND HoMosExuALrrY 82-83 nn.100-03 (1980)).
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Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches celebrated same-sex un-
ions. 1' ° In short, "what tradition dictates" depends on which tradition
one chooses to emphasize.
A second problem with the "traditional" view of due process analy-
sis is that any tradition is usually in a constant state of flux. Neither
practices nor concepts remain static through time. For example, the
Book of Leviticus offers the most stinging condemnation of homosexual-
ity in the Christian Holy Bible: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with
womankind; it is abomination."''1 1 Closer inspection of Leviticus also
surfaces the following admonitions: adulterers and gay men must be exe-
cuted; animal sacrifices must be made to the Lord; and menstruating wo-
men must cleanse themselves through animal sacrifices.' 02 These
practices have hardly stood the test of time and few would argue for their
reinstatement today. A more secular example is found in the pages of a
book which could not be more secular: the dictionary. Although some
dictionaries adhere to the conventional definition of marriage as the
"[I]egal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife,"' 0 3
others have adopted the gender-neutral definition of "an intimate or close
union."'104 Thus, whether the tradition is religious or secular, isolating
any practice or concept in a fixed form is as difficult as catching quicksil-
ver in a sieve.
B. MARRIAGE AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Despite the obvious deficiencies inherent in considering tradition at
all, the Supreme Court has developed a due process doctrine centered on
past conceptions of liberty. To have a fundamental right to engage in a
particular practice, that practice must be deemed "implicit in the concept
100 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 6.
101 Leviticus 18:22 (King James).
102 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 101 (citing Leviticus 3-4, 8, 12, 20:10-16). For fur-
ther commentary on the antiquated precepts of Leviticus, see SuLLrvAN, supra note 3, at 27-28;
Scott K. Kozuma, Note, Baehr v. Lewin and Same-Sex Marriage: The Continued Struggle for
Social, Political and Human Legitimacy, 30 Wn.iMra'= L. REV. 891, 891 n.3 (1994);
Scocca, supra note 30, at 760 n.246.
103 BLACK'S LAw DIcTONARY 972 (6th ed. 1990).
104 WEBSTmR'S NmNT NEw Couc.xraT DicrIoNAY 729 (1983); see also ESKRIDGE,
supra note 15, at 89 n.2 (listing dictionaries adopting gender-neutral definitions of marriage).
Mark Strasser suggests that state legislatures that rush to declare same-sex marriages void may
inadvertently be acknowledging the applicability of the term "marriage" to same-sex unions:
"[T]hose legislatures that explicitly reject same-sex marriage are themselves implicitly indicat-
ing that they do not believe that same-sex marriages are definitionally precluded-if such
unions were definitionally precluded, pronouncements declaring them void would be unneces-
sary." Strasser, supra note 95, at 925. The same point applies to DOMA. One cannot defend
DOMA by arguing that same-sex unions are definitionally precluded from the concept of mar-
riage because, were that the case, Congress would not have been compelled to define marriage
as the union of one man and one woman. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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of ordered liberty." 105 Of course, this definition suggests the practice
must be "deeply rooted in the traditions of the nation." 10 6 Through a
series of opinions, the Court has indicated that marriage meets these
criteria.
Several cases discuss the importance of marriage to individual lib-
erty. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court referred to marriage, in
Maynard v. Hill,107 as "the foundation of the family and of society, with-
out which there would be neither civilization nor progress."' 1 8 In 1923,
the Court remarked that the right to marry is "essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." 10 9 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,110 a case
striking down a sterilization scheme for certain classes of criminals, Jus-
tice Douglas's opinion for the Court called marriage "fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race.11 By the mid-sixties, a decade
in which little reverence was shown for any institution, the Court set a
new standard for the veneration of marriage when it said in Griswold v.
Connecticut:112
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the de-
gree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose
as any involved in our prior decisions.1 1 3
105 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
106 Wardle, supra note 24, at 33.
107 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
108 Id. at 211.
109 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
110 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
111 Id. at 541. Although this passage closely links marriage with the function of procrea-
tion, that link becomes attenuated in subsequent opinions. See infra notes 145-56 and accom-
panying text.
112 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
113 Id. at 486. Michael Sandel finds this passage especially applicable to gay men and
lesbians because "like marriage, homosexual union may also be 'intimate to the degree of
being sacred ... a harmony in living . . . a bilateral loyalty,' an association for a 'noble
purpose.'" MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DIscoNTENT 104 (1996). In fact, Professor
Sandel decries the frequency with which Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)-a case
upholding the right to view obscene materials in the privacy of one's home-is employed,
instead of Griswold, as a precedent for homosexual rights. See SANDEL, supra, at 106. He
elaborates:
[T]he analogy with Stanley tolerates homosexuality at the price of demeaning it; it
puts homosexual intimacy on a par with obscenity-a base thing that should none-
theless be tolerated so long as it takes place in private. If Stanley rather than Gris-
wold is the relevant analogy, the interest at stake is bound to be reduced ... to
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Two years later, in striking down an anti-miscegenation statute, the
Court, through the pen of Chief Justice Earl Warren, in Loving v..Vir-
ginia,114 stated, "The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."' " 5 The Loving Court went so far as to say that denial of this
"fundamental freedom" constituted a deprivation "of liberty without due
process of law."" 6
In Zablocki v. Redhail,117 the Court refused to give effect to a Wis-
consin statute which restricted the right of fathers in arrears with their
child support obligations to marry. Zablocki is perhaps the most impor-
tant case protecting the fight to marry because the Court subjected a
"marital impediment" statute to strict scrutiny for the first time." 8 The
Court reasoned that, since it would make "little sense to recognize a right
of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with re-
spect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the
family in our society," 19 a fundamental right to marriage required ac-
knowledgment. Furthermore, according to the Court, any statute that
places a "direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get mar-
ried"'120 must be "supported by sufficiently important state interests and
[be] closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."'12 1 However,
"reasonable regulations that do not significantly, interfere with the deci-
sion to enter into the marital relationship may be imposed"'122 without
"sexual gratification." (The only intimate relationship at stake in Stanley was be-
tween a man and his pornography.)
Id. at 107.
114 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
115 Id. at 12.
116 Id. Since Loving was actually decided on equal protection grounds, some commenta-
tors have belittled the relevance of the case to any due process argument. To such commenta-
tors, the language about the fundamental right to marry is ancillary to the Court's invective
against the challenged law's promotion of white supremacy. See, e.g., Scocca, supra note 30,
at 724 (claiming the Loving Court's discussion of fundamental nature of right to marry was
only "incidental" to primary issue of racial discrimination); Robert F. Drinan, The Loving
Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHto ST. L.J. 358, 358-59 (1968) (arguing that, due to
racist motivation of anti-miscegenation law, the Court did not have to "confront the question
of the limits of the state's power to regulate the freedom of choosing one's spouse"). One
critic offhandedly dispatches the Loving Court's discussion of fundamental rights as dicta. See
Hannah Schwarzschild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and
Legal Anomaly, 4 BERKELEY WoMaN's L.J. 94, 99 (1988-89).
117 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
118 See Schwarzschild, supra note 116, at 102 (observing that Zablocki "represents the
first time that the Court applied strict scrutiny to the right to marry").
119 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
120 Id. at 387 n.12.
121 Id. at 388.
122 Id. at 386.
19971
224 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:203
incurring this exacting scrutiny. 123 Once one realizes the huge obstacle
Zablocki sets for any statute that "significantly interferes"' 24 with the
right to marry-strict scrutiny review is generally fatal in fact-one can-
not overstate the impact of Zablocki on the constitutional evaluation of
marriage statutes such as DOMA.
In addition to the aforementioned cases explicitly commenting on
the fundamental right to marry, several other Supreme Court opinions
indirectly affirm the notion that governmental regulation of marriage
should be minimal. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,12 5 the Court
stated that individual liberty necessitates the protection of certain inti-
mate associations:12 6
[C]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical
role in the culture and traditions of the Nation ....
123 Although Justice Marshall's Zablocki opinion does not use the exact words "strict
scrutiny," the "closely tailored" test described therein seems to be the functional equivalent of
strict scrutiny review. Under strict scrutiny review, as it is generally understood, the state must
have a "compelling" interest to justify the statute in question. See Stacey Lynne Boyle, Note,
Marital Status Classifications: Protecting Homosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14 HAs-
riNGs CoNsT. L.Q. 111, 119 (1986). Moreover, strict scrutiny prohibits the government from
offering "underinclusive or overinclusive justifications for its statutes." Friedman, supra note
14, at 149. Zablocki's "sufficiently important state interests" appear on par with "compelling
state interests" and the Zablocki Court's insistence on the suspect statute effectuating only
those sufficiently important interests mandates a perfect fit between the statute's purpose and
effect, with neither underinclusivity nor overinclusivity permitted. Thus, one can call
Zablocki's scrutiny "strict"-honestly and without any hermeneutic sleight of hand.
124 If the Zablocki Court did not elaborate what it meant by "significantly interferes," an
exception big enough to swallow the rule could have been created. To wit, DOMA supporters
could argue that the law does not elicit strict scrutiny because it does not significantly interfere
with the fundamental right to marriage-that it merely regulates the "effect" of its recognition
in other states. Fortunately, the Zablocki Court did explain what it meant and thereby pre-
empted such a position. In a case decided earlier in the same term, Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S.
47 (1977), the Court applied rational basis review in upholding a portion of the Social Security
Act which terminated benefits to certain disabled individuals upon marriage. The Zablocki
Court distinguished the "deadbeat dad" statute from the Social Security Act by remarking that
"[t]he Social Security provisions placed no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring
to get married" and that "there was no evidence that the laws significantly discouraged, let
alone made 'practically impossible,' any marriages." 434 U.S. at 387 n.12. This description
hardly applies to DOMA. Not only does it place direct legal obstacles in the path of same-sex
couples (e.g., under DOMA's definition of marriage, no federal tax benefits of any kind can
accrue to a homosexual spouse-so marriage becomes more costly for homosexuals than for
all other citizens), it also significantly discourages same-sex marriages from occurring at all by
facilitating their nonrecognition in states throughout the union. Based on the distinction articu-
lated in Zablocki, DOMA would have to withstand strict scrutiny to survive.
125 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
126 Kenneth Karst considers the following list of values inherent in intimate association:
the opportunity to enjoy the society of certain other people; the opportunity for caring, com-
mitment, and love; the opportunity to know another human being as a whole person rather than
as the occupant of a particular role; and the opportunity to be seen-and to see oneself-as a
whole person rather than as an aggregate of social roles. See TaBE, supra note 93, § 15-21, at
1424 n.30 (citing Kenneth Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 630-
36 (1980)).
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[T]he constitutional shelter afforded such relationships
reflects the realization that individuals draw much of
their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state in-
terference therefore safeguards the ability independently
to define one's identity that is central to any concept of
liberty. 127
The Roberts Court displayed keen concern not only for the intrinsic
value personal relationships add to society, but also for the manner in
which such bonds permit individual self-expression. 128 In the epic opin-
ion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,129 the Court found that "[a]t the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'130 Thus, the
theme of individual autonomy based on personal, life-altering decisions
threads its way from Roberts to Casey. Finally, in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,13  the Court struck down a city ordinance preventing ex-
tended families from inhabiting a single unit and shunned rigid defini-
tions of "family" in an effort to protect the right "to come together for
mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life."'132
Such definitional flexibility lends itself to the assertion that "family"
need not be a term dependent on sexual orientation. Taken together,
Roberts, Casey and Moore stand for the proposition that there are no
correct, predetermined decisions for each individual to make in life133
127 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
128 In analyzing Roberts' language of self-definition, one commentator advances a novel
argument in favor of homosexuals' right to marry. According to this theory, for gay men and
lesbians, the right to marry does not just spring from substantive due process, but from a
"coalition" of due process protection and First Amendment protection. See Link, supra note 3,
at 1078. The First Amendment guarantee of free expression is "critically important" to gay
men and lesbians because "[u]nlike racial characteristics, or differences based solely on gen-
der, homosexual citizens must assert their identity as a homosexual person through some form
of speech before they may even have a public identity as a homosexual." Id. at 1078 n.176.
Consequently, phrases such as "'acknowledged,' 'admitted,' or 'self-identified,' nearly always
accompany the word 'homosexual' in conventional public discourse when referring to a homo-
sexual speaker." Id. This argument provides an added dimension to the same-sex marriage
debate: the idea of marriage, beyond its practical benefits and symbolic cachet, as a public
proclamation of full citizenship. If some citizens are denied the right to this proclamation
(especially the minority group that relies on expression more than other minority groups), it
becomes difficult to see how the First Amendment could not be implicated.
129 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
130 Id. at 2807.
131 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
132 Id. at 505.
133 Justice Blackmun made this point in his Bowers v. Hardwick dissent:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their inti-
mate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that
there may be many "right' ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of
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and, to the extent one's choices determine one's identity, the Due Pro-
cess Clause shields the right to make those choices without governmental
interference.
C. THREE PUTATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DOMA-AND WHY THEY
FAIL
Although the fundamental nature of marriage for every citizen be-
comes manifest upon reviewing the relevant case law, marriage, by its
very nature and to a greater degree than just about all other fundamental
rights, necessitates the involvement of the state. "[U]nlike such activities
as abortion and access to birth control," explains one commentator,
"[marriage] does not exist independent of the state."'134 Furthermore,
"marriage is an institution by which the state gives additional rights to
individuals who choose to form that intimate association."' 35 As such,
the marriage contract is "controlled by the state-and... is 'subject to
the control of the legislature."' 136 One state court judge once went so far
as to say, "[T]here are, in effect, three parties to every marriage, the man,
the woman and the state."137 Still, the mere fact that the state plays a
vital role in the exercise of this fundamental right does not diminish its
due process protection. The line between "state involvement" and "gov-
ernmental interference" arguably may be ephemeral, but it is a line the
Supreme Court must draw in subjecting DOMA to strict scrutiny, as re-
quired by Zablocki. Three putative governmental interests can be sup-
plied to rationalize DOMA. Unfortunately for backers of DOMA, all
three stand as rationalizations which collapse under strict scrutiny.
One potential state interest is procreation. DOMA's advocates may
argue that the statute promotes procreation by discouraging same-sex
marriages. This interest suffers three fatal flaws. First, it has no ground-
ing in reality. No marriage license in the nation is granted "on the condi-
tion that the couple bear children; and the marriage is no less legal and
the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose
the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.
478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also SAtNEL, supra
note 113, at 93 ("A right to be free of governmental interference in matters of marriage, for
example, can be defended not only in the name of individual choice but also in the name of the
intrinsic value or social importance of the practice it protects.").
134 Vincent C. Green, Note, Same-Sex Adoption: An Alternative Approach to Gay Mar-
riage in New York, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 399, 401 (1996) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
7 (1967)).
135 Id.
136 TRiBE, supra note 93, § 15-21, at 1432 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205
(1888)).
137 Schwarzschild, supra note 116, at 105 (quoting Fearon v. Treanor, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816
(1936)).
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no less defensible if it remains childless."'138 If such a criterion did exist,
it would affect elderly, sterile and impotent couples in addition to homo-
sexual couples. 139 The country's soaring illegitimacy rate140 is evidence
that "marriage is neither a logical nor a biological predicate of procrea-
tion."'141 In fact, DOMA works to discourage procreation because "some
same-sex couples may elect not to have children precisely because their
relationship is not sanctioned by the state."'142 Second, DOMA is both
underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to this interest. It is under-
inclusive because "many married heterosexual couples cannot, or elect
not to, have children."'143 It is overinclusive because millions of gay men
and lesbians can and do have children. 144
Third, the Supreme Court has handed down a litany of opinions
severing the conceptual link between marriage and procreation. Turner
v. Safley' 45 is chief among these cases. In Turner, a unanimous Court
upheld the right of prisoners to marry even if the strictures of confine-
ment preclude procreation. The Court considered marriage's other attrib-
utes-its "expression[ ] of emotional support and public commitment";
its reflection "of religious faith as well as... of personal dedication"; its
expectation of full consummation; and its function as a "precondition to
the receipt of government benefits"-in deciding it was still worthy of
constitutional protection. 146 The potential for procreation appeared no-
where in the opinion as a valid criterion for invoking the right to
138 SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 179.
139 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 96.
140 Social scientists project a "50 percent illegitimacy rate by the turn of the century."
Strasser, supra note 95, at 953 n.253 (quoting Mary McGrory, No Legitimate Solution in Sight,
WAsH. POST, Mar. 16, 1995, at A2).
141 Id. at 953. Besides, empirically speaking, the "real danger to human survival is from
overpopulation, not underpopulation." Friedman, supra note 14, at 161 (citing generally A.J.
STUART, OvEPtopmArON: TwENT CENTuRY NMmsis (1958)).
142 Developments, supra note 68, at 1610; see also Strasser, supra note 95, at 959 (specu-
lating gay men and lesbians might be deterred from procreating "precisely because they are
barred from marrying").
143 Developments, supra note 68, at 1610.
144 See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Strasser, supra note 95, at 960
(arguing that, even had the Supreme Court ruled that marriage was only a fundamental right
for the purpose of procreation, "marriage would still be fundamental for gays and lesbians who
are also raising children needing a stable and loving environment"); Developments, supra note
68, at 1610 (finding same-sex marriage restrictions overinclusive in serving the interest of
procreation because "gay and lesbian couples can have children").
145 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
146 Id. at 95-96.
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marry. 147 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 14 8 the Court upheld a California
statute presuming a child's father to be the natural mother's husband, not
the biological father. 149 According to Michael H., the marital priorities
of family stability supersede procreational interests determined solely by
biology. In short, the Court does not equate protecting marriage with
protecting procreation. Finally, Griswold v. Connecticut,150 which pro-
tects the right to contraception,15' and Roe v. Wade,15 2 which regards the
right to an abortion as among a woman's fundamental rights, stand for
the general proposition that "a purported state interest in increasing
human population cannot sustain a [statute]"'1 53 that violates a funda-
mental right. In neither case did the procreation argument emerge as a
justification for the challenged anti-contraception and anti-abortion stat-
utes-leaving one to wonder if the states themselves found the argument
even "marginally credible." 154 Overall, due to its lack of connection to
actual practices, its underinclusivity and overinclusivity, and the line of
Supreme Court cases repudiating it, the interest in procreation proves to
be not only less than compelling-but less than coherent as well.
A second putative interest furthered by DOMA is the protection of
children. Children benefit from the "legal advantages their parents re-
ceive"'155 and one could argue that condoning same-sex marriages would
dilute those advantages (both material and social). Additionally, discour-
aging same-sex marriages reduces the likelihood a homosexual couple
will feel comfortable raising children and, therefore, reduces the number
of children who will have to endure the stigma of living in a same-sex
household. Again, the twin demons of underinclusivity and overin-
clusivity rear their ugly heads. DOMA would be underinclusive in trying
to satisfy this interest because millions of children already live in same-
sex households 156 and are denied all the advantages that accrue to the
147 Based on the logic of Turner, homosexuals should be higher in the nuptial hierarchy
than convicts. If the marriage right still obtains for individuals who cannot procreate and
cannot even have sex (i.e., prisoners), then a fortiori the right should obtain for individuals
who can at least have sex freely (e.g., homosexuals not in prison). Cf. Marks v. Marks, 77
N.Y.S.2d 269 (Kings County Sup. Ct. 1948) (holding that the impossibility of procreation does
not allow the state to bar a couple from marrying).
148 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
149 See id. at 121, 129.
150 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
151 See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
152 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
153 Friedman, supra note 14, at 161; see also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 131 (interpreting
Griswold and Roe to demonstrate that "the state cannot impose a procreation goal on married
couples").
154 Friedman, supra note 14, at 161 n.176.
155 Id. at 162.
156 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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offspring of legal marriages. DOMA would also be overinclusive by
leaving unscathed the benefits accruing to childless heterosexual couples
who marry and never have children. As for the "stigma" issue, the best
way to counter the opprobrium that hounds the children of same-sex
marriages is to validate such marriages in the eyes of the law. "Such
recognition," contends one commentator, "would do more good than
harm because this would tend to legitimize the offspring of such un-
ions."' 57 In Palmore v. Sidoti,158 the Court found that a mother cannot
lose custody of her child simply because of the societal prejudice against
her interracial marriage and concluded that children are best protected by
objecting to stigmatization, not fueling it. Yet, DOMA does nothing to
assist the children of same-sex couples and actually exacerbates their
plight by reducing their chances of being raised by legally married par-
ents. Thus, DOMA is not "closely tailored" to the furtherance of the
interest in "protecting children" but, in light of the number of children it
harms, it may be well suited to undermining that interest.
A third governmental interest justifying DOMA could be the pro-
motion of the nation's sense of morality. Of course, in a country as di-
verse as the United States, all citizens never reach a consensus on any
moral issue; so, the "nation's sense of morality" actually means the "ma-
jority's sense of morality." With regard to same-sex marriage, most
Americans' opposition seems attributable to nothing more than animosity
towards gay men and lesbians (especially since the "procreation" and
"protection of children" rationale lack cogency).' 5 9 While appealing to
widespread bigotry may help members of Congress win elections, the
Supreme Court has never masked its disdain for laws animated by preju-
dice. The Court has stated that "mere public intolerance or animosity
cannot be the basis for abridgment of ... constitutional freedoms.' 160 In
Palmore especially, the Court conceded that public prejudice may be one
of the costs of living in a free society, but it is not a cost which should be
legitimized in the eyes of the law. "The Constitution cannot control such
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them," declared the Palmore Court,
"[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
157 Friedman, supra note 14, at 164; see also Erik J. Toulon, Call the Caterer: Hawaii to
Host First Same-Sex Marriage, 3 S. CAL. REv. L. & WoMEiN'S ST'UD. 109, 125-26 (1993)
("[I]f the state truly has an interest in protecting children, same-sex marriages would be per-
mitted, thereby furthering the emotional security of children who are members of such
families.").
158 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
159 A cynic could assert that this generalization about "most Americans" comprises
judges. See, e.g., Schwarzschild, supra note 116, at 125 ("Whether judges rely on their indi-
vidual sexual tastes or couch these inclinations as the moral views of 'right-thinking people,' it
seems likely that their legal conclusions rest, at least in part, on personal orientation and nor-
mative models of morality.").
160 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
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directly or indirectly, give them effect."1 6 1 Therefore, one need not even
reach the question of whether DOMA is closely tailored to this interest
because the answer to the antecedent question of whether the interest is
compelling is clearly no. When the "state interest in promoting
majoritarian morality is based on 'irrational prejudice and fear of uncon-
ventional activities and lifestyles,' "162 that interest is not merely uncom-
pelling, but illegitimate. DOMA finds no justification in moral norms
which, without preventing any "objective and concrete harm,"' 63 seek to
abridge the fundamental right to marriage.
D. THE IRRELEVANCE OF BOWERS
Since (1) the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to say
there is a due process right to marriage; (2) DOMA works to restrict the
free exercise of that right; and (3) DOMA is not closely tailored to serve
a compelling state interest, one is hard-pressed to devise a due process
argument in support of DOMA. Nonetheless, one Supreme Court case,
Bowers v. Hardwick,164 lays the foundation for a pro-DOMA due process
argument. Upon careful consideration, however, one realizes that any
pro-DOMA argument based on Bowers amounts to nothing more than an
exercise in sophistry. Bowers has no bearing on the constitutionality of
DOMA.
In upholding a Georgia statute outlawing sodomy, 16 5 the Bowers
Court found that "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procrea-
tion on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated" 16 6 and, consequently, that the right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy does not enjoy constitutional protection. This opinion has
led some commentators to conclude that, "[i]f a state constitutionally
may prohibit same-sex sexual relations, as it may under Bowers... 'then
a prohibition against homosexual marriage can easily be upheld
.... 16 The next logical inference would be that, if states can prohibit
161 466 U.S. at 433.
162 Developments, supra note 68, at 1611 (quoting Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of
Restrictions on the Right to Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George-or Mary and Alice at the
Same Time?, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 33, 55 (1984)).
163 Friedman, supra note 14, at 167; cf LAuRENcE H. TmuE, AMERICAN CONSTrunONAL
LAW § 15-19, at 981 (1978) (stating in First Amendment context that "harms existing only in
the eye or mind of the voluntary beholder cannot justify restricting otherwise protected
behavior").
164 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For further discussion of Bowers, see supra notes 64 and 133.
165 The Georgia statute, like most statutes of its ilk, applied to heterosexual sodomy as
well as homosexual sodomy. See supra note 64. For some inscrutable reason, the Court
treated the statute as if it applied to homosexual sodomy alone.
166 478 U.S. at 191.
167 Wardle, supra note 24, at 35 (quoting Craig M. Bradley, The Right Not to Endorse
Gay Rights: A Reply to Sunstein, 70 IND. L.J. 29, 33 (1994)).
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same-sex -marriage, then the federal government can assist them in with-
holding recognition of such marriages by enacting DOMA. One little
detail ruins this syllogistic endeavor the Bowers Court said nothing
about outlawing same-sex marriages. 168
The power to ban sodomy by no means contains the power to re-
strict marriage. One need only juxtapose Bowers with the Court's hold-
ings relating to the fundamental right to marriage in order to bask in this
revelation. As William Eskridge argues, Turner, perhaps more than any
other case, illustrates the distinction between restricting sex and restrict-
ing marriage. 169 Professor Eskridge notes: "[Under Turner, t]he state
can prohibit sex between inmates, can prohibit sex between inmates and
outsiders, and can regulate and probably prohibit sex between inmates
and their spouses. Nonetheless, the state cannot prohibit inmates from
marrying without showing a factually supportable penological inter-
est.' 170 One can thus infer from Turner that "the state has more freedom
to regulate sex than it has to regulate who may marry."'171 With this
distinction in mind, Bowers then stands for the rather limited proposition
that "states have fairly broad discretion in regulating nonmarital sexual
activity"'172 but says nothing about the right to marriage. Therefore, just
as states may criminalize sodomy between unmarried heterosexuals with-
out being able to preclude sodomy between married heterosexuals, states
may also criminalize sodomy between unmarried homosexuals without
being able to preclude sodomy between married homosexuals.' 73
168 The very language of Bowers indicates its irrelevance as a precedent for the issue of
same-sex marriage. Professor Strasser articulates this point when he says, "Mhe Court could
not in good faith echo its Bowers decision by claiming that there is '[n]o connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand' and same-sex unions on the
other... [S]ame-sex marriage may have to be recognized as a fundamental right before
sodomy can be included within the right to privacy." Strasser, supra note 95, at 975 (quoting
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)).
169 See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 134.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 134-35. Professor Eskridge subsequently explains that prohibitions of same-sex
marriage would not be constitutionally justified by an interest in discouraging sodomy. See id.
at 136. Even accepting arguendo the dubious premise that discouraging sodomy constitutes a
compelling state interest, prohibitions on same-sex marriage would be both overinclusive and
underinclusive pursuant to this interest and therefore would fail Zablocki's "closely tailored"
requirement. See id. Some homosexual couples engage in nonsodomitic sexual activities
(e.g., mutual masturbation, bondage, "frottage") so marriage prohibitions would be overinclu-
sive as applied to them. See id. Furthermore, many heterosexual couples engage in sodomy,
so the prohibitions would be underinclusive as applied to them. See id. If subjected to strict
scrutiny, neither state prohibitions nor DOMA would seem closely tailored to this particular
interest.
173 See Strasser, supra note 95, at 975. One commentator offers an interpretation of Bow-
ers vis-a-vis the right to marry slightly different from Professor Eskridge's and Professor
Strasser's. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 164. According to this commentator, Bowers
permits states to criminalize sodomy even within the marital relationship but does not permit
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Another point should be made to those who rely heavily on Bow-
ers174 in concluding homosexuals have no due process right to marriage:
the opinion has been almost universally condemned as wrongly de-
cided. 17 5 Professor Eskridge observes that the "disposition and reason-
ing [of Bowers] have been criticized from every perspective known to
law professors.' 76 Even Charles Fried, staunch conservative scholar
and Solicitor General during the Reagan Administration, has "urged that
Bowers be overruled as inconsistent with the principles of the earlier
precedents."'17 7 Still, no hue and cry from the academy can match the
force of the most damning condemnation of all: Justice Powell, whose
concurrence with the majority decided Bowers by a vote of 5-4, has pub-
licly admitted that he made a mistake in concurring with the majority in
Bowers. 1
7 8
Any commentator trying to build a pro-DOMA due process argu-
ment based on Bowers should realize what land developers in the Florida
states to prohibit same-sex marriages altogether. See id. ( "There is no necessary contradiction
between recognizing the family rights of same-sex couples and criminalizing sexual acts such
a couple is capable of performing."). So, while this commentator agrees with Professor Es-
kridge and Professor Strasser that Bowers does not limit the right of homosexuals to marry, she
disagrees with them as to how far the state can go in regulating sexual activity. This view does
not accord much weight to the right to marital privacy created by Griswold and Zabloiki as do
the views of Professor Eskridge and Professor Strasser. One should note that Turner seems
more in line with this commentator's position (regarding the regulation of marital sex) than
with the position of Professors Eskridge and Strasser. For a similar interpretation, see Devel-
opments, supra note 68, at 1606-07 n.23 ("Just as Mormons did not forfeit the right to free
exercise of religion simply because the state proscribed polygamy, a practice that their religion
once espoused, so too homosexuals do not forfeit their fundamental right to marry because the
state can proscribe sodomy.").
174 In her diatribe against same-sex marriage, Lynn Wardle refers to Bowers as "the most
important precedent." Wardle, supra note 24, at 34.
175 Granted, this point may be more political than legal but, since jurists often base their
judgments on the scholarly approval or disapproval of certain precedents, it is a point which
demands attention.
176 ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 134 (citing Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality,
and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1081-91 (1988); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 Wis. L. Rxv. 187, 230 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493,
1494-99 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, 341-50 (1992); Thomas B. Stoddard,
Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 648, 655-56
(1987); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONS'rruONAL LAW § 15-21, at 1425-29 (2d ed.
1988); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1741-42 (1993); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
HARv. L. Rv. 737, 799-802 (1989); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy:
Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 147 (1988); David Cole & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual
(Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319, 325-30 (1994); Kendall Thomas,
Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1461 (1992)).
177 ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 134 (citing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW, 81-84
(1991)).
178 See Scocca, supra note 30, at 737 n.97 (citing Linda Greenhouse, When Second
Thoughts in Case Come Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at A14).
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Everglades have known for years: the foundations for success are just not
there. Considering Bowers does not speak to the issue of same-sex mar-
riage, has elicited resounding reproach from the academy and has been
called a mistake by its decisive voter, one wonders about the attraction to
Bowers. Whatever the root of its appeal, Bowers poses no obstacle at all
to a due process attack on DOMA. To recapitulate the three prongs of
that attack: (1) the Supreme Court recognizes the fundamental right to
marry; (2) DOMA works to restrict the free exercise of that right; and (3)
DOMA is not closely tailored to further a compelling state interest. Con-
sequently, DOMA infringes on due process protections guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment and can therefore be ruled unconstitutional on that
basis.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
By enacting DOMA, the federal government has failed to provide
certain citizens with the equal protection of the law mandated by the
Fifth Amendment. 179 Two alternative arguments manifest themselves in
support of this position. One argument is that DOMA denies equal pro-
tection to homosexuals, as a class, by aiding states in withholding recog-
nition of same-sex marriages. Another argument is that sexual
orientation is irrelevant since DOMA shapes its restrictions along gender
lines. According to the latter argument, DOMA fails to pass muster be-
cause it is an instrument of gender discrimination. Both arguments can
be persuasive and both have some flaws. However, upon close examina-
tion, the gender discrimination argument seems the stronger of the two.
Review of the gender discrimination argument leads to the conclusion
that DOMA unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of gender.
A. THE SUSPECT CLASS ARGUMENT
At first glance, the equal protection doctrine, unlike the tradition-
centered due process doctrine, appears amenable to the protection of
homosexuals as a disadvantaged social group. As Cass Sunstein ex-
plains, "the Equal Protection Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate
practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were
179 Although the Fifth Amendment does not feature an explicit "Equal Protection Clause"
as does the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause as incorporating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause-
and has thereby imposed a duty of equal protection on the federal government. See Boling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (stating that although the Fifth Amendment does not specifi-
cally mention equal protection, "the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stem-
ming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive"); see also Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (positing that federally sanc-
tioned internment of Japanese Americans "deprives all those within its scope of the equal
protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendmenf').
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expected to endure."' 8 0 The Court echoed this assessment of the equal
protection doctrine by stating it "is not shackled to the political theory of
a particular era .... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment.. . do
change."'18 1 This forward-looking approach, coupled with the negative
(albeit muddled) impact of Bowers on due process advocacy, has caused
many same-sex marriage proponents to gravitate towards equal protec-
tion arguments.1 82
Under traditional equal protection analysis, the scrutiny with which
the Court examines a law depends upon whether the law creates a sus-
pect classification. Suspect classifications trigger either strict scrutiny18 3
or heightened, intermediate scrutiny.' 8 4 To pass strict scrutiny, legisla-
tion must be closely tailored to give effect to a compelling state interest,
while intermediate scrutiny demands that laws "serve important govern-
mental objectives and . . . be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." 18 5 Both levels, to varying degrees, extend equal pro-
tection solicitude to "discrete and insular" minorities, or those in a sus-
pect class. 186 The critical question, then, is "What constitutes a suspect
class?"
The Supreme Court has developed the following five criteria to
identify suspect classifications: (1) the class has endured a long history
of discrimination; (2) the characteristic has no effect on the group's abil-
ity to contribute to society; (3) the group has virtually no political power;
(4) members of the class bear a badge of distinction; and (5) the charac-
teristic by which the class is identified is immutable.' 8 7 Thus far, the
Court has conferred suspect class status, warranting strict scrutiny, to
race, 8 8 nationality, 189 religion' 90 and alienage.' 9 1 Similarly, the Court
has assigned quasi-suspect status to gender 192 and parentage (i.e., indi-
viduals born out-of-wedlock). 193
180 Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1163.
181 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966).
182 See Wardle, supra note 24, at 27.
183 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
184 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
185 Id.
186 This phrase found life in the most famous footnote in American constitutional history:
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
187 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-87 (1973) (explicating the five suspect
class criteria).
188 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discussed supra at notes 114-16 and ac-
companying text).
189 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, (discussed supra at note 179, arguably involving the
symbiotic classification of both race and nationality).
190 See Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992) (referring to "suspect lines
like race or religion").
191 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
192 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
193 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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Having defined the criteria establishing suspect and quasi-suspect
classifications, the next logical question becomes, "Do homosexuals
meet these criteria?" For three of the requisite elements, the answer is
clearly yes. Documented incidents of historical discrimination are le-
gion-easily satisfying the "history of discrimination" criterion. Indeed,
considering the dearth of uplifting chapters in American gay and lesbian
history, it is not an exaggeration to say, "[T]he history of homosexuality
has been largely a history of opprobrium."' 94 William Eskridge lists sev-
eral legal discriminations suffered by homosexuals in this century alone:
[Y]ou could not have a job in the federal or most state
civil services, have a national security clearance, serve in
the armed forces, immigrate to the United States or (if
you slipped in by mistake) become a U.S. citizen, use
the U.S. mails for your informational magazines, obtain
some professional and business licenses, dance with
someone of the same sex in a public accommodation,
loiter in a public place, hold hands with someone of the
same sex anywhere, or (heaven forfend) actually have
intercourse with someone of the same sex. 195
The second criterion regarding a group's ability to contribute to so-
ciety barely necessitates discussion. Even vociferous opponents of same-
sex marriage seldom make the claim that homosexuals are unable to fully
contribute to society as a result of their sexual orientation. As Professor
Eskridge notes, "No impartial judge, no executive officer, no respected
professional, no competent senator, no unbiased observer of any scruple
is willing to say that sexual orientation bears any relation to lesbian and
gay people's ability to participate in and contribute to society."' 96 The
third criterion, the lack of political power, is also met by homosexuals.
Fearing societal discrimination, a majority of homosexuals still conceal
their sexual orientation in public. This closeted existence stifles their
ability to organize and make their presence felt politically. 197 The fact
that DOMA was able to pass both Houses of Congress-escaping even a
veto from the White House-underscores this point.198 Thus, there is
194 TRIBE, supra note 93, § 15-21, at 1427 (footnote omitted).
195 ESK RGE, supra note 15, at 180.
196 Id. at 177.
197 See id. at 180.
198 Writing before the passage of DOMA, Professor Eskridge exhibits an eerie prescience
on the subject: "Antigay amendments proposed in the U.S. Senate are regularly adopted by
huge margins .... In short, for every two steps forward the gay rights movement often suffers
a step or two backward because of sometimes hysterical backlash against homosexuality." Id.
at 181. Lynn Wardle challenges the political powerlessness of homosexuals by noting that
homosexuals have higher incomes and are better educated than the average American. See
Wardle, supra note 24, at 93 (citing Stephen Zamansky, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homo-
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little dispute that the first three suspect class criteria apply to
homosexuals.
Turning to the two remaining criteria (the "badge of distinction" and
the immutability of the group's distinguishing trait), one confronts the
main obstacles to claiming unequivocally that classifications based on
sexual orientation are "suspect." It is difficult to identify a discernible
badge of distinction because "homosexuals are born afresh in every gen-
eration and every social, racial, and economic class." 199 Gay men and
lesbians "have no identical family; with each birth, they are presented
with a lottery of social and economic circumstance . . . . [which] can
lead to great privilege as much as to destitution. '"2 ° °
A possible "badge of distinction" could be found in stereotypical
homosexual "traits." As insulting as stereotypes about "effeminate" gay
men and "masculine" lesbians are, such traits would at least furnish out-
wardly detectable signifiers defining the group. However, reality does
not always coincide with legal theorizing. Research indicates that, in
terms of gender role behavior, most gay men are not effeminate and most
lesbians are not masculine in appearance or behavior.20 1 In reality, no
badges of distinction exist for homosexuals. As for the question of im-
mutability, the evidence is, at best, inconclusive. The scientific commu-
nity has yet to embrace a credible study establishing "firm support for
[the] biological determinism of homosexual behavior." 20 2 However, it
would be foolish to categorically reject biology as a component of sexual
orientation because it remains unclear what role biology plays in relation
to "early child development, experience, psychology, and [the other] so-
cial factors . . . in the constellation of influences that affect human
choices about sexual behavior. ' 20 3 This tenuous link between biology
sexuals' Right to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221, 247 (1993)). However,
Professor Wardle seems to confuse economic prosperity with political empowerment. As An-
drew Sullivan notes, many homosexuals excel professionally precisely "because they have not
disclosed their sexuality." Andrew Sullivan, The Politics of Homosexuality, NEw REPuBLIC,
May 10, 1993, at 24, 34. Personal wealth often comes at the cost of political silence.
199 SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 153.
200 Id.
201 See Link, supra note 3, at 1061 (citing Peplau & Gordon, The Intimate Relationships
of Lesbians and Gay Men, in CHANGING BOUNDARIES: GENDER ROLES AND SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
228-29 (1983)).
202 Wardle, supra note 24, at 72. "Opinion in the scientific community is mixed at best,
with the majority supporting a social conditioning theory that incorporates a limited genetic
predisposition." Farabee, supra note 27, at 266 (citing NATIONAL INsrrtrr OF MENTAL
HEALTH TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY, FINAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS 77
(1972)).
203 Wardle, supra note 24, at 74 (citing William Byne & Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual
Orientation: The Biologic Theories Reappraised, ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY, Mar. 1993, at
236-37).
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and homosexuality 2°4 renders any claim of immutability unsubstantiated
and possibly even disingenuous.
Some commentators have challenged the value of criteria (such as
the badge of distinction and immutability) that are dependent on visible,
biological characteristics. Professor Sunstein, for one, has asserted, "Im-
mutability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for treatment as a
'suspect class." 205 Professor Eskridge concedes that homosexuals are
neither discrete nor insular.20 6 However, Eskridge responds, women are
also "neither insular (everywhere you find men you find women) nor a
minority (they are more than half the population)" 20 7 but gender discrim-
ination still yields heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes. 208
If one considers the select categories to which the Court has assigned
"suspect class" status, Professor Eskridge's point about internal inconsis-
tency acquires even greater force. Of the four suspect categories (race,
nationality, religion and alienage) and the two quasi-suspect categories
(gender and birth out-of-wedlock), only race, gender and the circum-
stances of birth are truly immutable. Further, only race and gender are
physicial manifestations-or "badges of distinction"-that are difficult
to hide. Also, not every nationality and religion demarcates a discrete
and insular group in American society. German-Irish Protestants do not
face the same marginalized existence that, say, Iranian Muslims do in
this country. Obviously, it is not difficult to find the gaping holes in the
Court's "suspect class" framework.
Nevertheless, the incoherence of the Court's equal protection doc-
trine does not vitiate one inescapable fact: the behavioral aspect of ho-
mosexual identity separates homosexuals from minorities whose
identities are determined purely by factors beyond their control. Many
members of the black and Latino communities reject (and perhaps resent)
"the argument that gays are another minority group just like themselves,
struggling for equal rights. '20 9 People of color all along the political
204 Some commentators believe that the success of future civil rights cases on homosexu-
als' behalf hinges on the emergence of scientific evidence proving the immutability of homo-
sexuality. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Right Not to Endorse Gay Rights: A Reply to
Sunstein, 70 IND. L.J. 29, 38 (1994) ("[flf homosexuality can be shown to be, at least in part,
'immutable,' the argument for gay rights will enjoy more success in the courts."); Farabee,
supra note 27, at 266 (suggesting that, unless homosexuality is considered "a naturally occur-
ring biological condition .... homosexuals are unlikely to achieve suspect class status").
205 Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1994).
206 See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 179 n.j ("Lesbians and gay men are a minority but are
typically anonymous or closeted rather than discrete (you cannot tell by looking) and are often
dispersed rather than insular (though there are gay ghettoes in most major cities).").
207 Id.
208 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
209 Wardle, supra note 24, at 82 n.367 (quoting Dennis Famey, Shaky Ground, Wall St.
J., Oct. 7, 1994, at Al, A6).
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spectrum, from Colin Powell,210 avatar of the Gulf War, to bell hooks,211
subversive black feminist, have expressed this sentiment. Even some
gay rights advocates, such as Andrew Sullivan, consider the comparison
to other minorities a facile one:
Homosexuals can pass. Most blacks cannot. Most Lati-
nos cannot. Women cannot. Even Jews, who are per-
haps the closest analogy to homosexuals in this regard,
are more easily identifiable: when they have no Jewish
physical features, they have Jewish families and Jewish
lineages. They can be traced. But homosexuals are born
in the midst of the other; they have the names of heter-
osexuals; they have no identifiable characteristics; and
they reappear randomly in every generation. They have
more power in this respect than any comparable minor-
ity, because they have the power to define and choose
the moment and nature of their public identity. 212
This passage powerfully articulates that homosexuals differ from other
minorities in that they have a choice. The term "choice" does not refer to
"being a homosexual or not being a homosexual" but, rather, to "letting
the world know or not letting the world know." This element of choice
imbues homosexuals with a sui generis quality that distinguishes them
from other minorities-and dilutes any parallels (e.g., a history of dis-
crimination) drawn between homosexuals and other minorities.
The Court, perhaps in response to the perception that its assortment
of suspect and quasi-suspect classes is irrational, has displayed a reluc-
tance to create any new suspect categories.2 13 Keep in mind, even the
210 "Skin color is a benign non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps
the most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a convenient
but invalid argument." Id. at 82 (quoting Letter from General Colin L. Powell to Representa-
tive Patricia Schroeder (May 8, 1992), in David F. Burrelli, Homosexuals and U.S. Military
Personnel Policy, Jan. 14, 1993, at 25-26).
211 Hooks contends:
The need to make gay experience and black experience of oppression synonymous
seems to be one that surfaces much more in the minds of white people.... While it
in no way lessens the severity of such suffering for gay people, or the fear that it
causes, ... in a given situation the apparatus of protection and survival may be
simply not identifying as gay.
... White people, gay and straight, could show greater understanding of the impact
of racial oppression on people of color by not attempting to make these oppressions
synonymous, but rather by showing the ways they are linked and yet differ.
BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 125 (1989).
212 SuLLIvAN, supra note 3, at 152.
213 In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Court found that an
ordinance which denied a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally
retarded violated principles of equal protection-but refused to rule that the mentally retarded
constituted a suspect class.
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ostensible landmark opinion that struck a blow for gay and lesbian rights,
Romer v. Evans,214 did not classify homosexuals as a suspect class. In-
stead, the Court merely struck down Colorado's anti-gay amendment be-
cause it bore no "rational relationship to a legitimate government
purpose.1215 One may conjecture that, if the Court were to classify
homosexuals as a suspect class, it would have done so in Romer. Based
on that refusal, the Court, as currently constituted, would probably not
consider homosexuals a suspect class in evaluating DOMA. From an
analytical perspective, this trend need not be considered an obstacle for
gay and lesbian equality. As demonstrated, the current set of suspect and
quasi-suspect classes makes little sense, but adding sexual orientation to
their ranks would only add to the confusion (indeed, the Court would
fashion a sounder framework by rescinding some of the extant suspect
and quasi-suspect categories-for example, everything except race and
gender-than by incorporating a new category). The element of choice
argument differentiates gay men and lesbians from other minorities to
such a degree that the equal protection doctrine would seem almost arbi-
trary if a minority group, whose identity is at least partially self-actu-
ated,216 were considered a suspect class. Application of suspect class
status to individuals who may (or may not) choose to be recognized as
members of an oppressed group produces an insuperable amount of con-
ceptual discord. The notion of "choosing" to join a suspect class stands
contrary to the very purpose of the constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection: ensuring that the nation's laws protect those citizens (whether
they wish to be or not) categorized as members of "minorities." This
discord would exist regardless of the current Court's tendencies. There-
fore, suspect class status seems to be properly withheld from gay men
and lesbians for the purposes of equal protection analysis. Of course,
concluding that homosexuals do not compose a suspect class does not
end the equal protection analysis. Advocates of same-sex marriage have
the alternative of attempting "to achieve heightened scrutiny... by fo-
cusing on sex[-based] rather than sexual orientation-based
classifications." 217
214 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
215 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
216 Gay men and lesbians who come out of the closet have made a conscious decision to
withstand the discrimination and abuse concomitant to homosexuality. Women and people of
color make no such decision. Therefore, their minority status is thrust upon them, not "self-
actuated." The spirit of the equal protection doctrine seems solicitous of people in the latter
position more than it does people in the former,
217 Farabee, supra note 27, at 266.
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B. THE GENDER DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT
In Craig v. Boren,2 18 the Supreme Court subjected gender classifi-
cations to heightened scrutiny when it said such classifications "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to the achievement of those objectives. ' 219 DOMA erects two
types of gender classifications-one empowers states to consider gender
in extending the protection of their laws and the other enables the federal
government to consider gender in extending the protection of federal
law. By granting states leave to deny full faith and credit only to mar-
riages "between persons of the same sex, '220 DOMA has created a gen-
der classification. Consider the following hypothetical. A state refuses
to recognize same-sex marriages pursuant to the authority conferred by
DOMA. Woman A marries Woman B in Hawaii and subsequently
moves to this nonrecognizing state. If this state denies a marital benefit
to Woman A (e.g., the option of filing a joint state tax return), the denial
will be directly imputable to her gender. If Woman A were a man, she
could not be denied the marital benefit.
DOMA's second gender classification is even more blatant. By
proclaiming that the federal definition of marriage is limited to unions
between "one man and one woman," 22 1 DOMA once again distributes
legal benefits along gender lines. If Woman A were a federal employee,
for example, she would not be able to include her spouse on her em-
ployee health plan solely because of her gender. Due to these dichoto-
mous gender classifications, Craig requires that DOMA be subjected to
intermediate scrutiny. As discussed above,222 DOMA would have a very
difficult time surviving strict scrutiny or any type of heightened
scrutiny.2 23
In response to this assertion of gender discrimination, proponents of
DOMA may counter that DOMA does not make any distinction accord-
ing to gender because it applies to men and women equally. States may
withhold recognition of same-sex marriages regardless of each couple's
shared gender. This "equal application" argument carries a certain com-
mon sense appeal but also has a glaring flaw: the Supreme Court has
218 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
219 Id. at 197.
220 Defense of Marriage Act, supra note 11, § 2.
221 Id. § 3.
222 See supra part ll.C.
223 Although intermediate scrutiny obviously is not as exacting as strict scrutiny, DOMA
does not appear to be "substantially related" to its putative interests-i.e., promoting procrea-
tion, protecting children and maintaining a certain sense of morality-any more than it seems
"closely tailored" to them-which is to say, not at all. With regard to the first two interests,
DOMA is still both underinclusive and overinclusive. As for the final interest, promoting
majoritarian prejudice remains an illegitimate state interest, regardless of the intensity of the
Court's scrutiny (i.e., DOMA could not stand even if it "perfectly fit" this interest).
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already repudiated the "equal application" argument as a justification for
the abridgment of equal protection. In Loving v. Virginia,224 the Court
rejected Virginia's claim that its anti-miscegenation statutes did not en-
gage in "an invidious discrimination based upon race" because they
equally punished "both the white and the Negro participants in an inter-
racial marriage." 225 In explaining why the Virginia statutes violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,226 the Court stated:
[W]e reject the notion that the mere "equal application"
of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to
remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's proscription of all invidious racial discrimina-
tions .... In the case at bar.., we deal with statutes
containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal ap-
plication does not immunize the statute from the very
heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes
drawn according to race.227
The scope of Loving's precedential effect clearly prevents the Court from
ever upholding a racial classification merely because it is applied
equally. The murkier question is, "Can Loving's preemption of the
'equal application' argument be analogized to apply in a gender
context?"
Several courts have refused to, recognize an analogy between anti-
miscegenation laws and laws against same-sex marriage and, therefore,
have upheld the constitutionality of state laws restricting marriage to
heterosexuals. 228 Still, a plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court, in
Baehr v. Lewin,229 bucked this trend of narrowly interpreting Loving-
and applied its rejection of the "equal application" argument to a statute
224 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
225 1d. at 8.
226 Since state statutes were at issue in Loving, Virginia's laws violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, not the Fifth Amendment's guarantee. See supra
note 179 and accompanying text.
227 Loving, 388 U.S. at 8-9.
228 See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) ("[ln commonsense
and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based
merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex."); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(C.D. Cal. 1980).
229 852 P.2d 44, reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). Baehr v.
Lewin was the earlier procedural incarnation of Baehr v. Miike. Lewin imposed on Hawaii the
burden of presenting a compelling state interest to which its prohibition of same-sex marriages
was narrowly tailored-a burden the state failed to meet, on remand, in Miike. See supra notes
5-6 and accompanying text. One should note that the Lewin court subjected the contested
statute to strict scrutiny based on the Equal Protection guarantees of the Hawaii Constitution,
not the U.S. Constitution. See Lewin, 852 P.2d at 67. Article I, section 3 of the Hawaii
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enjoining same-sex marriages. The Lewin court explicitly adopted the
analogy in responding to its one dissenting member:
We understand that [the dissenting] Judge Heen [be-
lieves] that "HRS § 572-1[, the law in question,] treats
everyone alike and applies equally to both sexes[,]" with
the result that "neither sex is being granted a right or
benefit the other does not have, and neither sex is being
denied a right or benefit the other has." The rationale
underlying Judge Heen's belief, however, was expressly
considered and rejected in Loving .... Substitution of
"sex" for "race" and article I, section 5 [of the Hawaii
Constitution] for the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment yields
the precise case before us together with the conclusion
we have reached.230
By finding the Loving analogy persuasive, the Hawaii Supreme Court set
the stage for the subsequent lower court ruling in Miike that legalized
same-sex marriages in that state (pending appeal, of course).2 31 How-
ever, the Lewin court's endorsement of the Loving analogy, by itself,
does little to invalidate the "equal application" argument. As mentioned
earlier, other courts have not found the analogy convincing and have not
perceived a heterosexual requirement for marriage to be a form of gender
discrimination. Since the conflict among state courts offers little gui-
dance, one must assess the pertinence of the analogy by looking to the
objectives of the Loving Court itself.
Undoubtedly, the Loving Court was primarily focused on rendering
racially discriminatory (albeit equally applied) laws unconstitutional.
The Court took great pains to denounce anti-miscegenation laws as "in-
vidious racial discrimination" 232 and "odious to a free people. ' 233 None-
theless, does the Loving Court's intention to curb racial discrimination
preclude applying its reasoning in other contexts? Some, such as Profes-
sor Wardle, argue that "the language of Loving is specifically targeted at
racism, not at other categories of classification. '234 She supports her
claim by further stating that, "the great social harms produced by such
divisions by race are simply not akin to those produced by divisions by
sexual orientation. '2 35 One problem with this narrow interpretation of
Constitution constitutes an "Equal Rights Amendment" which renders a sex a "suspect cate-
gory" incurring full strict (not intermediate) scrutiny. Id.
230 852 P.2d at 67-68 (quoting Heen, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
231 Since Congress enacted DOMA in anticipation of Hawaii's legalization of same-sex
marriage, one could conclude that the Lewin ruling was the basis of DOMA's conception.
232 Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
233 Id. at 11 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
234 Wardle, supra note 24, at 78.
235 Id.
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Loving is that the equal protection doctrine has expanded since the
Court's decision. While it may be true that "[n]othing in the [Loving]
Court's equal protection analysis or language implies disapproval of dis-
crimination against same-sex relations or even hints of any concern about
permitting only male-female marriage," 236 modem equal protection anal-
ysis now comprises discrimination along nonracial axes such as national-
ity, religion and gender.237 In light of this doctrinal expansion, Loving's
application cannot be limited to racial discrimination alone.
A second problem with Wardle's narrow interpretation is that it
confuses the claim of gender discrimination with the claim that homosex-
uals are a suspect class. One may agree with Professor Wardle that divi-
sions according to race are not "akin" to divisions according to sexual
orientation, but that issue is irrelevant to a discussion of gender discrimi-
nation. By granting quasi-suspect status to gender classifications, the
Court has already conceded that gender classifications are "akin" to ra-
cial classifications. Professor Wardle misses this point entirely when she
says, "[Nothing in the [Equal Protection Clause of the] Fourteenth
Amendment discloses a[n] ... intent to protect or promote the social or
legal equality of homosexual relations. '238 Even if true, the same cannot
be said about gender equality after Craig and its brethren. Professor
Wardle and those who share her view do not realize that the Loving anal-
ogy only acquires cogency in making an argument for gender equality,
not an argument for homosexual equality. Attacking DOMA and all
state prohibitions of same-sex marriage as improper gender classifica-
tions does not require reading a mandate for homosexual equality into
the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment or any other part of
the Constitution. Such an attack merely protects gender equality as al-
ready required by the Court. In sum, the Wardle position of limiting
Loving to racial classifications cannot be accepted for two reasons: (1)
the position ignores the development of equal protection doctrine in the
years since Loving and (2) the position misconstrues the gender equality
approach as a homosexual equality approach.
However, if one rejects the Wardle position, there remains another,
more thoughtful argument against analogizing Loving into the gender
equality context. In Loving, the Virginia statute barred whites but not
non-whites from interracial marriages. 23 9 The Court found that the
asymmetrical contours of the classifications, indicated that they were
"measures designed to maintain White Supremacy." 240 The State of Vir-
236 Id.
237 See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
238 Wardle, supra note 24, at 79.
239 388 U.S. at 11 n.11.
240 Id. at 11.
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ginia viewed white "purity" (not racial "purity" in general) as essential in
maintaining white supremacy over the other supposedly inferior races.
This white supremacist objective rendered the restrictions patently un-
constitutional. This aspect of Loving strains the gender analogy. As one
commentator notes, "[T]he [Virginia] statute stigmatized Blacks, but not
whites. An identical argument cannot be made in the same-sex marriage
context: the restrictions would not seem to have any more tendency to
stigmatize women than men."24' To get a perfect parallel, DOMA and
the related state prohibitions would have to bar male same-sex unions but
permit female same-sex unions so that "male supremacy" would not be
undermined by signs of effeminacy.
Still, the imperfection of the Loving analogy does not rob it of its
utility. Laws against same-sex marriage may not stigmatize one gender
as inferior to the other but they do lead to another outcome which the
Court has found constitutionally impermissible: the reinforcement of
traditional sex roles. In Craig, the Court held that disparate legal drink-
ing ages for men and women could not be based on the "weak congru-
ence between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purported
to represent. '2 42 In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,243 the
Court struck down a classification which "perpetuate[d] the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."2 44 According to the
Hogan Court, governmental classifications must be "free of fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. '2 45 In Roberts v.
United States Jaycees,246 the Court stated, "[D]iscrimination based on
archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capaci-
ties of the sexes forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions
that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities." 247 The Court has
even recognized a parallel between racial discrimination and gender dis-
crimination in the reinforcement of traditional roles. In Personnel Ad-
ministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,248 the Court observed that
"[c]lassifications based on gender, not unlike those based upon race,
have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle dis-
crimination";2 49 such classifications may undergird the notion that the
"female [is] destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family,
and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. '250 Taken
241 Friedman, supra note 14, at 145 n.76.
242 Craig, 429 U.S. at 199.
243 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
244 Id. at 729.
245 Id. at 724-25 (emphasis added).
246 468 U.S. 607 (1984).
247 Id. at 625.
248 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
249 Id. at 273.
250 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
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as a whole, the Court's opinions on gender discrimination indicate that
statutes reinforcing archaic gender roles must be struck down even if
they are "rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism.'- 251
Restrictions on same-sex marriage, on either the state or federal
level, impose antiquated gender roles on the institution of marriage.
Prohibiting same-sex marriages "reproduces specific gender roles by en-
forcing a system in which gender is always relevant to the possibility of
intimate relations, and by obsessively focusing on a single type of sexual
conduct in which men and women have set, stereotyped positions. '252
By restricting marriage to heterosexuals, DOMA and its related state
statutes subscribe to an "ideology ... in which women are naturally
heterosexual and naturally desirous of marrying men, which naturally
results in their bearing children. '253 It does not require a great leap in
logic to surmise that gay men and lesbians face open hostility (of which
the restriction on marriage is just one example) precisely because they
threaten traditional gender roles by "allegedly engaging in activities 'in-
appropriate' for their sex."'254 One commentator notes that "[m]uch of
the psychological literature examining homophobia has concluded that
support for the traditional gender-role structure is a primary cause of
homophobia." 255 Furthermore, the "nonnuclear character of many gay
families poses an additional threat to majoritarian norms" 256 by under-
mining the belief that a "family" can only sprout from a heterosexual
union. If same-sex unions gain the imprimatur of marriage, then inevita-
bly, same-sex couples will gain social acceptance as parents as well; such
a conceptual shift could irrevocably alter traditional notions of the family
unit. All academic theorizing aside, it "should be clear from ordinary
experience that the stigmatization of the homosexual has something to do
with the homosexual's supposed deviance from traditional sex roles" 257
and that laws inhibiting same-sex marriage provide a means for preserv-
ing those roles.
251 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
252 William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy, 103
YALE LJ. 1495, 1528 (1994); cf Cox, supra note 16, at 1112 (arguing that sodomy laws
"impose traditional sex roles").
253 Eskridge, supra note 98, at 1510.
254 Strasser, supra note 95, at 946.
255 Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MiAim L. REv. 511, 617
(1992) (footnote omitted); see also Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of
Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 187 (1988) ("[C]ontemporary legal and cultural contempt for
lesbian women and gay men serves primarily to preserve and reinforce the social meaning
attached to gender.").
256 Costello, supra note 15, at 138 (citing BPaAN MILLER, Preface, HoMosExuALrry AND
Hmn FAMuY at xii (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989)).
257 Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Dis-
crimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 234 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
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Thus, the imperfection of the Loving analogy does not prove fatal to
a gender equality argument against DOMA. Unlike the Virginia statute
in Loving, DOMA does not overtly stigmatize one group in order to ele-
vate another. Nonetheless, DOMA performs the equally invidious func-
tion of buttressing "archaic and stereotypic notions"258 of particular
gender roles. This observation yields two immediate corollaries. First,
the maintenance of traditional gender roles parallels the promotion of
white supremacy in Loving as an unjustifiable statutory objective. Con-
sequently, the "equal application" argument rejected in Loving also fails
in the gender context, leaving no other credible justifications for
DOMA's gender-based discriminatory effect. Second, regardless of Lov-
ing's reach, DOMA is unconstitutional exactly because of its reinforce-
ment of traditional gender roles. As the formulations in Craig and
Hogan indicate, "[s]ince it began subjecting sex-based classifications to
heightened scrutiny, the Court has never upheld a sex-based classifica-
tion resting on normative stereotypes about the proper roles of the
sexes." 259 There is no reason for the Court to depart from this practice in
evaluating DOMA. Moreover, one struggles to conceive of a legislative
motive other than homophobia fueled by an obsession with ancient gen-
der roles that could have given rise to DOMA. For these reasons, the
Court should strike down DOMA as an unconstitutional gender classifi-
cation which bolsters outdated notions of the "appropriate" roles of men
and women.
C. THE AMBIVALENT RESPONSE TO THE GENDER DIsCRnINATION
ARGUMENT
Several commentators deride the gender equality approach in fight-
ing for the recognition of same-sex marriage. Professor Eskridge finds
there is a "transvestite quality to the argument . . . [in that it] dresses a
gay rights issue up in gender rights garb. '260 Similarly, since the Hawaii
Supreme Court utilized the gender-based approach in Baehr v. Lewin,
one commentator argues, "In terms of technical legal analy-
sis, ... [Lewin] does little to aid efforts to legitimize homosexuality. 261
For the same reason, another commentator remarks that Lewin has "been
embraced as an advance for the rights of gay men and lesbians, but it is
far less a gay rights case than a gender equality case. ' 262 While these
critics may voice the reservations of some same-sex marriage advocates,
258 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
259 Koppelman, supra note 257, at 218.
260 ESKRIDGE, supra note 15, at 172 (emphasis omitted).
261 Kozuma, supra note 102, at 905.
262 Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RPv. 505, 505
(1994).
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they offer little reason to favor the "suspect classification" approach over
a "gender discrimination" attack. Adding sexual orientation to the litany
of "suspect" categories would simply take an abstruse, inconsistent ana-
lytical framework and make it more confused. There is no reason why
homosexuals should constitute a suspect class but, for example, the men-
tally retarded should not.
A gender-based assault on DOMA avoids the suspect class quag-
mire altogether. The gender classifications of DOMA and any state
same-sex marriage prohibition are indisputable, as is their support for
rigid, archaic gender roles. The Court has established a clear line of
precedents condemning such classifications as unconstitutional. Consid-
ering all these factors, the gender-based approach offers a sounder argu-
ment for the extension of constitutional equal protection to same-sex
marriage than does the suspect classification approach. Any critic dero-
gating the intellectual merits of this approach as catering to gender equal-
ity instead of gay rights fails to grasp the crux of the argument. That is,
all discrimination against homosexuals ultimately derives from a manic
obsession with gender roles-so disentangling the twin issues of gender
equality and gay rights amounts to a futile, academic exercise. In real
terms, every step toward gender equality must, by its very nature, also be
a step forward for gay rights.
IV. RATIONAL BASIS ANALYSIS
Even if one casts aside the due process and equal protection argu-
ments for some type of heightened scrutiny, there remains some doubt
that DOMA could survive rational basis review-especially in the wake
of Romer. Although rational basis review generally manifests a great
deal of deference towards legislative rationalizations, the Romer Court
applied rational basis review "with bite."263 The Court found the Colo-
rado amendment, which precluded "all legislative, executive, or judicial
action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the
[status of persons based on their homosexuality], ' '264 to be grounded in
nothing other than "animus toward the class that it affects. ' 265 Accord-
263 In this respect, Cass Sunstein finds a thematic line of reasoning linking Romer and
Cleburne. See Sunstein, supra note 37, at 59-64. In Professor Sunstein's view, both the
Romer Court and the Cleburne Court employed rational basis review to strike down laws
expressing "a desire to isolate and seal off members of a despised group [i.e., homosexuals and
the mentally retarded, respectively] whose characteristics are thought to be in some sense
contaminating or corrosive." l at 62. Professor Sunstein endorses this form of rational basis
review "with bite" by concluding, "[Since] the proffered justifications were so weakly con-
nected with the measures at issue, the Court was right to do what it did in both cases." Id. at
63.
264 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
265 Id. at 1627.
1997]
248 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
ing to the Court, a law based solely on "personal or religious objections
to homosexuality" is not rationally related "to legitimate state
interests. 266
Romer raises considerable doubt that DOMA could survive rational
basis review for one simple reason: the Colorado amendment in Romer,
as baleful as it was, appeared far more "rational" than does DOMA. Af-
ter all, one can easily conceive of a "poorly fitting but probably ra-
tional" 267 justification for the Colorado amendment. For example,
banning anti-discrimination legislation for homosexuals could be con-
strued as a measure to preempt a rise in litigation. Such legislation could
have spared Colorado's courts the added congestion of criminal and civil
cases brought under the color of "pro-gay" statutes. Although this justi-
fication boasts little in terms of coherence (i.e., reducing extant causes of
action would do more to restrain overzealous litigants than would prohib-
iting potential causes of action before they exist), it does bear a patina of
rationality. By contrast, every credible justification for DOMA rests
either on the mistaken premise that all homosexuals are sterile and all
heterosexuals have children (i.e., the procreation and "protection of chil-
dren" arguments) 268 or on an illegitimate state interest (i.e., legitimizing
a prejudiced morality).269 The Colorado amendment merely tried to pre-
vent extending legislative solicitude-solicitude which may encompass
some but not necessarily all minority groups-to a particular minority
group. DOMA works to prevent the extension of a fundamental right-
which everyone outside the targeted group can exercise-to members of
a particular group. By any standard, the discriminatory effect of DOMA
is much more difficult to justify than that of the Colorado amendment in
Romer; thus, the former appears more "irrational" than the latter. Conse-
quently, the Court should hold DOMA unconstitutional if it applies ra-
tional basis review "with bite."
Were one able to descry some modicum of rationality in DOMA,
one still could not escape the strong implication of Romer that "it is no
longer legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as a class simply
because the state wants to discourage homosexuality or homosexual be-
havior." 270 Romer represents a denouncement of laws reflecting the
"judgment that certain citizens should be treated as social outcasts" 271-
266 Id. at 1629.
267 Sunstein, supra note 37, at 62.
268 See supra Part ll.C.
269 See id.
270 Sunstein, supra note 37, at 62.
271 Id. at 63.
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laws "motivated by a desire to create second-class citizenship. '272 In
short, Romer condemns the type of law that DOMA exemplifies. 273
V. GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN RECOGNIZING SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE
Whether the level of scrutiny incurred is strict, intermediate or ra-
tional, both the proponents and detractors of DOMA tend to focus the
debate on state interests in deterring same-sex marriages. In constitu-
tional discourse, there must be some state interest to justify laws that
appear to infringe upon individual rights-whether it is compelling, im-
portant or simply rational. Yet, any discussion of same-sex marriage
should also consider the converse interests of the state-interests in per-
mitting same-sex marriages. Full legalization (and perhaps even promo-
tion) of same-sex marriages would serve at least -four key governmental
interests: (1) providing stability for the millions of children growing up
in gay or lesbian households; (2) eliminating the need for marriage alter-
natives such as domestic partnerships; (3) promoting monogamy within
the homosexual community; and (4) dispelling the appearance that the
United States is becoming more of a confederacy, and less of a union.
Looking to the first interest, the children of homosexual parents
would benefit both emotionally and economically from the legal recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages. Although many homosexual parents may
find they can raise their children quite well without formalizing their
relationships, "the absence of demands-even the absence of defini-
tion-for unmarried relationships makes it impossible to identify, much
less enforce, an appropriate set of rights and duties ... through objective
legal rules. '274 In a nation as legalistic as the United States, "the com-
mitments inherent in formal families ... increase the likelihood of stabil-
ity and continuity for children."275
From a pragmatic perspective, forging a legal bond between the
child and the parent's partner-spouse 276 leads to several advantages for
the child-among them: "1) Social Security and life insurance benefits;
2) the right to sue for the wrongful death of the nonbiological parent; 3)
272 Id.
273 According to Professor Sunstein, "Congress's decision to allow [through DOMA]
nonrecognition here-unaccompanied by a decision to allow nonrecognition in other contexts
including marriages involving minors or incestuous marriages-appears to be a form of imper-
missible selectivity of the sort found in. Romer." Id. at 97 n.492.
274 Hafen, supra note 1, at 486.
275 Id. at 475.
276 "[S]tepparent adoption involves marriage [to the biological parent] and is covered by
statutory provisions that do not provide for adoption by unmarried partners." Elizabeth A.
Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the Relation-
ship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 177, 214
(1991).
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the right to inherit under the rules of intestacy; 4) health insurance cover-
age under both parents' policies; 5) the guarantee that the nonbiological
parent could make medical decisions for the child in the event of an
emergency; and 6) a legal obligation on the part of the second parent to
economically support the child, even if the parents separate. ' 27 7 These
advantages would not only increase the child's security but would also
reduce chances of the child needing state support.278 From an emotional
perspective, children in homosexual households often form lifelong at-
tachments to the "stepparent figure ... and these attachments warrant
recognition." 279 A child's emotional well-being can be just as essential
to proper development as the child's physical well-being-and the state
should endeavor to protect the former with the same urgency it does the
latter.280 In effect, the nonrecognition of same-sex marriages punishes
the children of homosexuals "for the 'sins' of their parents . . . . [by
denying them] the psychological, emotional, or financial benefits that
might accrue if they were in ... famil[ies] recognized by the state."2 8 1
No state interest in discouraging same-sex marriage can possibly be
worth the price such children are forced to pay.
Legalizing same-sex marriage would also eliminate the need for the
domestic partnership2 82 which is the alternative to marriage adopted by
various municipalities throughout the United States. Aside from the fact
that domestic partnership appears to be an ersatz form of marriage which
confers inferior benefits, 283 this legal innovation poses a considerable
277 Green, supra note 134, at 421.
278 See Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse
on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783, 1799 n.87 (1988) ("The support obligations and
clarification of rights that accompany marriage would benefit the children of homosexual par-
ents and may reduce the community's welfare burdens.").
279 Chambers, supra note 8, at 465; see also Toulon, supra note 157, at 125-26 ("[I]f the
state truly has an interest in protecting children, same-sex marriages would be permitted,
thereby furthering the emotional security of children who are members of such families.").
280 "While [decisionmakers] make the interests of a child paramount over all other claims
when his physical well-being is in jeopardy, they subordinate, often intentionally, his psycho-
logical well-being to, for example, an adult's right to assert a biological tie. Yet both well-
beings are equally important, and any sharp distinction between them is artificial." Delaney,
supra note 276, at 179 n.13 (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 4 (1973)).
281 Strasser, supra note 95, at 949; cf. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352 (1979) (hold-
ing that "it is unjust and ineffective for society to express its condemnation of procreation
outside the marital relationship by punishing the illegitimate child who is in no way responsi-
ble for his situation and is unable to change it").
282 In a "domestic partnership" municipality, two individuals, regardless of gender, can
register as partners and qualify "for health insurance, bereavement leave, insurance, annuity
and pension rights, housing rights (such as rent-control apartments), adoption and inheritance
rights." SuLLivAN, supra note 3, at 181.
283 One sign of domestic partnership's inferiority lies in its tax treatment. The IRS has
ruled that benefits extended to domestic partners "are taxable income to the employee if the
domestic partner" does not fit the Internal Revenue Code's definition of "dependent." Elbin,
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problem for the state. For while the domestic partnership option is
largely perceived as an outlet for homosexuals' nuptial yearnings, do-
mestic partners "don't need to have a sexual relationship or even closely
mirror old-style marriage. '284 Nothing stops "an elderly woman and her
live-in nurse" or "a pair of frat buddies" from registering as domestic
partners.285 Therefore, domestic partnerships could potentially "open a
Pandora's box of litigation and subjective judicial decision-making about
who qualifies." 286 Recognizing same-sex marriages, however, would ob-
viate the need for domestic partnerships in the first place and thereby
break the litigious wave before it surges forth.
Given the brushfire rate at which AIDS and other sexually transmit-
ted diseases are spreading throughout the country, it boggles the mind
that the state could overlook its interest in promoting monogamous rela-
tionships. "Public policy," notes one commentator, "must either en-
courage relationships, or it must encourage the alternative to
relationships, which is random sexual encounters. '287 At this point, pub-
lic policy dictates taking whatever measures will avert a worsening of the
current health crisis. Granting recognition to same-sex marriage presents
just such a measure due to the simple inverse correlation between long-
term monogamous relationships and the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases.288 No other state interest takes precedence over safeguarding
the health of the populace.
supra note 14, at 1084-85 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990)). Consequently, if
an employee's domestic partner fails to satisfy that definition, that employee "must pay taxes
on benefits his married co-workers receive tax free." Id. at 1085. Such disparities between the
treatment of domestic partners and married couples have caused several commentators to re-
ject domestic partnership as a viable alternative to marriage. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Heeb, Com-
ment, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American Family, and the Heterosexual Right to
Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. Rnv. 347, 359 (1993) (footnote omitted) (finding domestic part-
nership an "ineffective alternative for combatting the unequal treatment afforded to married
heterosexual couples and committed homosexual couples"); Farabee, supra note 27, at 240
("[D]omestic partnership laws ... exist only at the municipal level in metropolitan areas and
offer limited legal benefits."); Strasser, supra note 95, at 982 (emphasizing the fact that domes-
tic partnerships "do not give individuals all of the rights they would have if they were mar-
ried"); Link, supra note 3, at 1149 (branding domestic partnership "an inferior solution ... a
'separate but equal' status for yet another group of people disenfranchised by the majority");
see also Valerie Richardson, Domestic Partners Don Gay Apparel, WASH. TmsS, Feb. 15,
1991, at Al (calling San Francisco's domestic partnership ordinance "mainly symbolic, carry-
ing few legal obligations and no benefits").
284 SULLWVAN, supra note 3, at 182.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Link, supra note 3, at 1143 (quoting FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
Dnvamsrry FOR aH CrrY oF Los ANrELFS, Supp. Part I, at S-226 (1988)).
288 See id. ("[G]iven the realities of AIDS, public policy would seem to demand that gay
men, particularly, be encouraged to form stable relationships."); see also Lewis, supra note
278, at 1799 n.87 ("[Sitate recognition of homosexual marriage may promote public health
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The final key interest-maintaining a unified nation-may be the
most abstract but also the most fundamental. The impending recognition
of same-sex marriages in Hawaii means that such marriages will be valid
in at least some portions of the United States. At the same time, the
existence of DOMA and its state progeny threatens to cleave fissures of
conflict throughout the country. In light of this possibility, it becomes
clear that the same-sex marriage debate can no longer be relegated to the
margins as a "homosexual issue"; the debate now concerns every citizen
because, for the first time in recent memory, the legal fabric of the nation
seems to be fraying. The central question should not be, "What do gay
men and lesbians have to gain from same-sex marriage?" but "What do
all Americans have to gain from living within a unified nation?" 289 In
short, full recognition of same-sex marriage would serve the most basic
of state interests: maintaining national integrity.
The aforementioned state interests demand consideration in the
Court's constitutional calculus. The conceptual equation cannot simply
measure state interests in deterring same-sex marriage against individual
rights to marriage. The state has affirmative interests in permitting same-
sex marriage that the Court should bundle with individual rights in any
argument favoring same-sex marriage. Thus, the "state interest versus
individual interest" dynamic does not adequately describe this situation.
A "state interest versus combined individual and state interests" con-
struct is more accurate.
CONCLUSION
The Defense of Marriage Act definitely pushes the envelope of con-
stitutionality in an unprecedented fashion. Most students of constitu-
tional law have cut their teeth on statutes which potentially violated due
process or denied equal protection. DOMA not only traverses both those
fields but also ventures into the less traveled domain of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Nonetheless, whichever portion of the Constitution one
chooses to invoke-be it the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV-DOMA defies
its bounds. Furthermore, unlike most past constitutional transgressions,
DOMA exists as a blight not just on a particular set of rights or even on a
particular subset of society but on the legal infrastructure of the nation
itself. There are many convincing arguments, from a number of perspec-
interests by encouraging long-term monogamous relationships that reduce the threat of sexu-
ally transmitted diseases, such as AIDS.").
289 These contrasting questions paraphrase a point made by one commentator: "The ques-
tion is not what states specifically have to gain from recognizing Hawaii's marriages, the
question is what states have to gain from surviving within a unified nation." Balian, supra
note 38, at 425.
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fives, in favor of striking down DOMA: full faith and credit; due process;
equal protection. One can even challenge its rationality. DOMA is a
dragon vulnerable to so many swords that choosing the one with which
to slay it poses a perplexing task. Still, any approach should produce the
same assessment: DOMA is unconstitutional and cannot stand as valid
law. Should the Supreme Court ever reach this conclusion, and strike
down DOMA, it will save many sacred bonds from the statute's attenuat-
ing influence-the most important of which may be the bond between
the states.
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